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Maritime Interception: Centerpiece of Economic Sanctions
in the New World Order
Lois E. Fielding*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of December 26, 1990, the Ibn Khaldun,
an "Iraqi-flagged cargo ship," plied the waters of the northern Arabian
Sea in the vicinity of Masirah Island as she proceeded to Basra, Iraq
after leaving the port of Aden.' Out of sight, the HMAS Sydney, the
USS Olendorf and the USS Fife coordinated operations and began the
interception process adopted by the Multinational Interception Force
(MIF).2
Using bridge to bridge radio, the on-scene commander issued the
warning: "In accordance with its previously published notice to mariners,
the United States intends to exercise its right to conduct a visit and
search of your vessel under international law. Request you stop your
vessel and prepare to receive my inspection team." 3 The Ibn Khaldun
refused to slow. The request was repeated until 5:30 a.m. when a U.S.
Navy helicopter placed a team of Marines and SEALS from the am-
phibious ships USS Trenton and USS Shreveport on the Ibn Khaldun.4
© Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. The description is based on accounts contained in Department of Defense, United
States Central Command First Weekly Briefing (Dec. 26, 1990) (Question and Answer
Briefers: Lt. Col. Mike Gallagher, Maj. Gen. Dave Starling, Lt. Col. Greg Pepin, Col.
Tom Coury at Hyatt Hotel, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter Central Command Briefing];
Molly Moore, Challenge on the High Seas: Stop, Board, and Search, Wash. Post, Dec.
27, 1990, at Al, § 1; Severing Saddam's Lifeline: Maritime Interception Controls the
Flow to Iraq, 892 All Hands 10 (Desert Storm Special Issue: The Navy-Marine Corps
Team 1991) [hereinafter Severing Saddam's Lifeline]; Tom Delery, Away the Boarding
Party!, 71 Naval Institute Proceedings 66 (May 1991); Department of Defense, United
States Central Command Weekly News Briefing (Jan. 16, 1991).
2. See the authorities cited in supra note 1.
3. Moore, supra note 1, at Al, § 1. The transmission of this notice is required by
U.S. Navy procedure as part of the interception process. Id.
4. Id. See also Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note 1, at 12. During interceptions
in which the target vessel refuses to allow boarding, the practice has included sailing one
Allied vessel across the bow of the target vessel and firing warning shots across the bow
of the target vessel. The procedure may include low-level passes by F-14 and F/A-18
aircraft. Delery, supra note 1, at 66.
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At 5:40 a.m. the team slowed the ship, and at 6:00 a.m. a multinational
team of Australian and U.S. sailors approached and boarded.,
The inspection team found large quantities of milk, rice, cooking
oil, and sugar in addition to other prohibited cargo on board the Ibn
Khaldun for which no permission had been obtained from the Security
Council through U.N. procedure.6 The ship was diverted for being found
in violation of U.N. sanctions.'
The operation involved only one of more than 15,000 vessels which
had been intercepted and one of over 1000 vessels boarded throughout
the Persian Gulf crisis. The coalition naval force in place was composed
of more than 100 ships and 25,000 personnel contributed from about
twenty countries.' As a part of this force, the MIF, under the coor-
dination of Admiral Mauz, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, included
more than forty-five U.S. ships and 15,000 U.S. personnel and more
than thirty ships from foreign forces. 9 Twenty ships of this force were
5. Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note I, at 12; Delery, supra note 1, at 66;
Moore, supra note 1, at Al, § 1. After verifying the manifest and inspecting the vessel,
the boarding party attempted to advance to the pilot house. A crew member moved to
block the approach and take the weapons of the inspection team. Id.
The team fired "pistol warning shots into the air" and discharged smoke grenades
and noisemaker grenades to control the crowd. There were no injuries reported by the
inspection team or the Ibn Khaldun crew; however, the ship's master claimed that four
Ibn Khaldun passengers were injured during inspection team activities. Id.
A United States military doctor boarded the ship in order to determine the seriousness
of the injuries, but found no evidence of injury to passengers. The master of the Ibn
Khaldun took the position that "the passengers did not require medical evacuation." Id.;
see Central Command Briefing, supra note 1.
6. The Ibn Khaldun transported sugar, milk, spaghetti, and tea to Umm Qasar and
"hosted nearly 250 passengers later identified as 'peace activists' protesting the embargo
of Iraq .... ." Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note 1, at 13.
7. Id. The Iraqi version differs. The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Tariq Aziz, in a letter dated December 27, 1990 (ME/0957/A/I) to U.N. Secretary-General
Javier Perez de Cuellar, charges that
seven warships, one of which was an aircraft carrier belonging to US and British
forces, at 0445 [Baghdad] local time [0145 gmt] yesterday, 26th December 1990,
carried out a barbarous aggression against the peace ship Ibn Khaldun .... The
attacking soldiers were aggressive towards the ship's crew and the women and
children, pelted them with tear-gas and stun grenades and fired shots in the air
to terrorize the peace messengers, the women and children who were on board
the ship. The aggressors then detained the ship's captain and crew, seized all
its documents and destroyed all the videotapes and recordings in the possession
of several journalists representing television stations in Iraq, Yemen and Japan.
8. Delery, supra note 1, at 66. The data regarding interception and boarding was
supplied by Commander Michael Hinkley JAGC, USN assigned as Force Judge Advocate
to Commander Middle East Force on board the flagship USS LaSalle in the Persian Gulf
from September 1989 to August 1991 (Nov. 1, 1991) (Correspondence of Nov. 30, 1992
in author's files).
9. Rear Adm. W. Fogarty, Department of Defense, United States Central Command
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used exclusively in the interception operation itself.10 The success of the
maritime interception operations has been attributed to the "profes-
sionalism of all the navies, innovative communications plans, and fre-
quent coordination meetings."'" "If ever there were an example of
international resolve, the intercept operations has to be it.' 12 Over-
whelmingly, U.N. member states complied with Resolutions 661, 665,
and 670 and supported the Persian Gulf naval interception effort even,
in a number of instances, in the face of mounting domestic economic
losses and internal strife and opposition. 3
This article reviews the legal criteria of maritime operations and the
historical practice of maritime zones in the hostile setting from World
War I to the present day. 14 The Persian Gulf interception is analyzed
as a method of sanction enforcement in the "new world order."
As economic sanctions emerge as a principal method of maintaining
stability in the post-cold war era and promote the use and further
development of limited naval operations as a sanctioning device, the
realities of cooperation, accountability, and high visibility of state activity
in this changed environment impose limitations and establish additional
criteria on naval operations utilized as such. As the "first defining event
of the post-Cold War world," the Persian Gulf operation is a subject
of analysis which permits observation of these limitations and criteria."
The Persian Gulf interception could establish the paradigm of the mar-
itime zone permitting limited naval operation conducted on a multilateral
basis under the authority of the United Nations or other international
organization with the purpose of maintaining peace and stability of the
world order. 16 As a maritime action undertaken to enforce sanctions
Weekly News Briefing (Jan. 16, 1991). Delery, supra note 1, at 66-67. Foreign navies
involved include The United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Italy, Greece, Belgium, Canada, Australia, Argentina, the United States, the "Gulf Co-
operation Council countries" of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and
Qatar. Id.
10. Delery, supra note 1, at 66.
11. Id. at 68.
12. Fogarty, supra note 9.
13. Sanctions: 106 Countries Reply, U.N. Chron. 13 (Dec. 1990). "On 6 September,
the Secretary-General reported that 140 replies had been received from 106 countries on
measures taken to implement the sanctions. Nine States-Bulgaria, India, Jordan, Lebanon,
Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Yugoslavia-indicated they were confronted
with special economic problems in carrying out Resolution 661." Id.
14. Whiteman dichotomizes naval operations in this area as "blockade" and "measures
distinguished from blockade." 10 M. Whiteman 872 (1968).
15. Paul H. Nitze, World Order from Hiroshima to Kuwait, 44 Naval War College
Review 7, 14 (Autumn 1991).
16. Id. Nitze argues for a "new strategic concept" of U.S. leadership with the United
States "as an honest broker seeking the accommodation and protection of diversity within
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previously established under Article 41,17 and endorsed subsequently by
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the in-
terception offers the opportunity to study the further development and
clarification of U.N. Charter principles.
II. CRITERIA OF LAWFULNESS OF MARITIME ZONES IN HOSTILE
SETTINGS
Treaty and convention law developments in the law of blockade
generally have been attempts to control and structure the practice in a
more organized, restrained, and humane manner. However, the only
convention or treaty principles that have been preserved in practice are
those that proved workable or practical considering the manner of
warfare and the state of weaponry technology at the time. As Tucker
has astutely observed:
For the most part, it would appear, neutral protests failed to
acknowledge that a significant area of neutral-belligerent rela-
tions depended upon the character of hostilities and the restraints
belligerents would feel compelled to accept, not as a matter of
strict law but for reasons of expediency. And this implied, in
turn, that belligerent interferences with neutral trade by sovereign
right could be contested on the political and economic levels
though only with difficulty on a legal basis."9
At what point "reasons of expediency" take precedence over "strict
law" is unclear and can only be evaluated by analyzing the conduct of
nations in war. Certainly, it is fundamental that, even if states feel
compelled to observe principles of laws of war from a sense of legal
obligation, the principles will be transgressed if the nation's survivability
deems it necessary.
There does exist a classic model of blockade 19 against which the
lawfulness of a particular blockade may be measured; however, this
model has been largely disregarded in practice because of innovations
largely tied to modifications in naval warfare. The key to understanding
the changes in the form of blockade and the variety of techniques in
evidence over the history of naval operations is to realize that the form
of each maritime zone and its method of enforcement is dictated by
a cooperative international framework .... In fact, U.S. leadership of the international
response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which has been aptly described as the first
defining event of the post-Cold War world, represents precisely the type of effort the
strategic concept envisages." Id. at 14.
17. U.N. Charter art. 41.
18. 10 M. Whiteman 793 (1968) citing Tucker, The Law of War and Neutrality at
Sea 184-85 (1955).
19. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the specific features of the particular conflict at hand as well as the
military objectives to be obtained in that conflict. Factors which can
be isolated as shaping and defining the zone include, among others, the
objective of the war zone, the sophistication of arms technology avail-
able, the number and location' of the belligerents, the strategy of warfare,
the configuration of the coastline, and the extent of ocean covered. 20
The complexities of warfare innovations have made it difficult for
convention law to accurately control or keep abreast of the proliferating
features of maritime zones in hostile settings. While some convention
law in this area was an attempt to codify customary international law,
others were aspirational. Regardless, none has been satisfactory in struc-
turing blockade operations, and most were abandoned or considered
outdated before or shortly after commencement of hostilities. Hence,
the law of blockade is largely customary international law with con-
vention law providing support.
A. 1856 Declaration of Paris and 1909 Declaration of London
In large part, the traditional law of naval blockade is an accom-
modation of the need of a belligerent to subjugate the opposing bellig-
erent by inflicting damage on its ability to sustain a war effort, both
materially and psychologically, and the need of neutrals to carry on
world trade and maintain a stable world economy. 21 This accommodation
is apparent in the 1856 Declaration of Paris and the 1909 Declaration
of London.
20. Edward W. Carter, Blockade, Naval Institute Proceedings 42 (Nov. 1990); see
also Horace B. Robertson, Interdiction of Iraqi Maritime Commerce in the 1990-1991
Persian Gulf Conflict, 22 Ocean Dev. and Int'l L.J. 289 (1992). Frits Kalshoven lists as
developments affecting the law of prize the following:
[Ilntroduction and increased deployment of the submarine, followed by that of
the air arm; increasingly widespread use of mines of all types; establishment of
danger areas, war zones, exclusion zones, etc.; practice of "sink-on-sight," both
within and beyond such zones; blockade of entire coasts; virtually unchecked
extension of the lists of contraband goods; application of the doctrine of
continuous voyage to all such goods; diversion of neutral commercial shipping
to belligerent ports instead of search at sea; issue, by belligerent consular
authorities in neutral ports, of documents testifying to the non-contraband
character of cargo or to the innocent character of the vessel (navicerts); convoy
of neutral vessels by belligerent warships; and so on.
Frits Kalshoven, 1909 London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, in
The Law of Naval Warfare 257, 272 (Natalino Ronzitti ed. 1988).
21. "The law establishes a balance of interests that protects neutral commerce from
unreasonable interference on the one hand and the right of belligerents to interdict the
flow of war materials to the enemy on the other." Department of the Navy, Annotated
Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations NWP 9
(REV.A)/FMFM 1-10 7-24 (1989) [hereinafter Annotated Supplement to the Commander's
Handbook].
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The fundamental concept of the close-in blockade as established by
the 1856 Declaration of Paris and the 1909 Declaration of London
remains the paradigm of the concept of blockade, at least for the U.S.
Navy. This is acknowledged and reflected in The Commander's Hand-
book on the Law of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy (Commander's
Handbook). Although the Commander's Handbook describes the "tra-
ditional rules of blockade" as being "for the most part customary in
nature, having derived their definitive form through the practice of
maritime powers during the nineteenth century," the principles of block-
ade set forth are the basic principles of blockade established in the
Declarations of 1856 and 1909.22
First, "a blockade must be established by the government of the
belligerent nation .... The declaration should include, as a minimum,
the date the blockade is to begin, its geographic limits, and the grace
period granted neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the area to be
blockaded. ' 23 Second, "it is customary for the belligerent nation estab-
lishing the blockade to notify all affected nations of its imposition.' '24
Third, "in order to be valid, a blockade must be effective. '25 Fourth,
"a blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels and aircraft of
all nations." '26 Finally, "a blockade must not bar access to or departure
from neutral ports and coasts. "27 Rights of neutral nations and rights
of belligerents are balanced by protecting all neutral commerce except
that which emanates from or is bound for blockaded territory.
2
22. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations NWP 9 (Rev.A)/FMFM 1-10, 7.7.1 (1989) [hereinafter Com-
mander's Handbook]. According to the Commander's Handbook, "[T]he belligerent right
of blockade is intended to prevent vessels and aircraft from crossing an established and
publicized cordon separating the enemy from international waters and/or airspace." Id.
23. Id. at 7.7.2.1. This principle is derived from the 1909 London Declaration, article
9 which states, "A declaration of blockade must include I) The date when the blockade
begins; 2) The geographical limits of the coastline under blockade; 3) The period within
which neutral vessels may come out." Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Hand-
book, supra note 21, at 7-35 nn.129 & 130.
24. Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, at 7.7.2.2; Id. at 7-35, 7.7.2.2. This
principle is based on the 1909 London Declaration, articles 11 and 16. Article 11 states,
"A declaration of blockade is notified: I) To neutral powers .... 2) To the local authorities
.... " Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-35,
n. 131.
25. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-35,
7.7.2.3. This is derived from the 1856 Paris Declaration, article 4 and the incorporation
of that principle in the 1909 London Declaration, article 2. Article 2 of the London
Declaration states, "In order to be binding, a blockade must be effective." Id. at 7-35
n.132.
26. Id. at 7-36. The impartiality principle is derived from the 1909 London Declaration,
article 5 which states, "A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations."
Id. at 7-36, n.133.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 7-36. In fact, a "right" exists in neutral nations "to engage in neutral
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B. U.N. Charter
1. Use of Force
Subsequent to October 24, 1945, when the U.N. Charter entered
into force,2 9 the establishment of maritime zones, as a measure of force,
must be undertaken consistently with U.N. Charter provisions. Use of
force is permitted under the U.N. Charter if it qualifies as a valid
measure of self-defense undertaken in accordance with Article 51, a
measure authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII generally
or under Article 42 specifically, an enforcement action within a regional
arrangement undertaken with the authorization of the Security Council
under Article 53, or otherwise authorized by an organ of the U.N.3 0
Conversely, the maritime practices involving use of force must not qualify
as an unprivileged "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" under Article 2(4)."
commerce that does not involve trade or communications originating in or destined for
the blockaded area." This is derived from Article 18 of the London Declaration, which
states, "The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts." Id. at
7-36, n.134.
29. Leland M. Goodrich et al., Charter of the United Nations 9 (1969).
30. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security . . . ." U.N. Charter art. 51.
"Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 42.
"The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of
the Security Council .... ." U.N. Charter art. 53.
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art
2, para. 4.
31. See G.A. Res, 377(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc.
A/1775 (1950). But see Certain Expenses of the United Nations, (I.C.J. 1962) ("action"
in Article 11(2) interpreted as "enforcement action"). John Norton Moore, The Use of
Force in International Relations: Norms Concerning the Initiation of Coercion, in National
Security Law 182 (John Norton Moore et al. eds. 1990) [hereinafter Moore, The Use of
Force]; Rosalyn Higgins, Institutional Modes of Conflict Management, Id. at 193, 239.
See D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces, 290-95 (1964).
For in-depth discussion of use of force under the U.N. Charter, see Moore, The Use
of Force, supra, at 85-157; Michael N. Schmitt, Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal
and Practical Perspective, 2 U.S. Air Force Acad. J. of Legal Stud. 21, 32-33 (1991).
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The interpretation of the right of self-defense under Article 51 has
been debated at length. One view interprets Article 51 as limiting the
customary international law right of self-defense to a defense against
an actual armed attack only.12 In accord with this view, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) defines the right of individual and collective self-
defense under Article 51 in the Nicaragua Case as exercisable only in
response to an "armed attack."3 3 The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case ex-
pressly takes no position on anticipatory self-defense. Another view
interprets Article 51 as not limiting the inherent customary international
law right of self-defense, and therefore not strictly limiting it to a
response against armed attack. Professor John Norton Moore describes
the right of defense under Article 51 as "parallel to that existing under
customary international law." 4 This view allows a right of anticipatory
self-defense and is supported in varying degrees as well by McDougal,
Bowett, and Stone. 3 The United States adheres to the view that a threat
of imminent attack gives rise to a right of anticipatory self-defense.
6
Without U.N. authorization, the right to resort to a blockade or other
32. This is the view espoused by Wright with "a small and special exception for ...
surprise nuclear attack." Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 546
(1963); Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave 141-45 (2d ed. 1979).
33. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. I (June 27).
34. John N. Moore, Iraq's Aggression Against Kuwait: Enforcing the Rule of Law
in the Gulf Crisis, 4 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 44 (1991-92) [hereinafter Moore, Enforcing
the Rule of Law]; Moore, The Use of Force, supra note 31, at 87 ("It should also be
noted that most scholars regard this defensive right in the Charter as coextensive with
the pre-Charter right of defense, that is, as an 'inherent' or 'natural' right of defense");
U.N. Charter art. 51; Gerhard Von Glahn, Law Among Nations 133 (1965).
35. Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J.
Int'l L. 597, 599-601 (1963) ("There is not the slightest evidence that the framers of the
United Nations" Charter, by inserting one provision which expressly reserves a right of
self-defense, had the intent of imposing by this provision new limitations upon the
traditional right of states") (quoting International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of
a Policy, Dept. of State Pub. 2702, at 164 (1946)); Philip C. Jessup, A Modern Law of
Nations 166-67 (1948) ("It is equally clear that an 'armed attack' is now something entirely
different from what it was prior to the discovery of atomic weapons"); Wolfgang Fried-
mann, The Changing Structure of International Law 259-60 (1964) ("in the absence of
effective international machinery the right of self-defence must probably now be extended
to the defence against a clearly imminent aggression, despite the apparently contrary
language of Article 51 of the Charter"); Louis Henkin et al., International Law, Cases
and Materials 736-46 (2d ed. 1987).
36. The Caroline, 2 Moore, Digest of International Law § 217, at 412 (1906) citing
Letter from Mr. Webster, U.S. Sec. of State, to Mr. Fox, British Min. at Wash. D.C.
(April 24, 1841).
The U.S. position on anticipatory self-defense is baseol on the Caroline requisites that
the necessity of self-defense be "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation" together with the additional requirements of necessity
and proportionality. Annotated Supplement to Commander's Handbook, supra note 21,
at 4-12, 4-13 n.29 (quoting The Caroline, supra at 412).
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maritime zone remains as unclear and undefined as the right of self-
defense under Article 51.
The United Nations' "Definition of Aggression" Resolution (Defi-
nition) specifically lists "the blockade of the ports or coasts of a State
by the armed forces of another State" as an act of aggression "regardless
of a declaration of war."37 Article 2 provides that "[tihe first use of
armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression . . 38 Therefore, even
outside of the traditional laws of war regime, under the resolution,
blockade remains an act categorized as an act of aggression. While the
Definition throws doubt on the first use of blockade, an anticipatory
defense use of blockade possibly could be "justified in the light of other
relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or
their consequences are not of sufficient gravity" as permitted under
Article 2 of the Definition.39 Otherwise, blockade is condemned by a
presumption of aggression unless justified under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. Note that the use of "blockade" in the Definition does not
necessarily include the more limited zones of quarantine, interdiction,
or interception. Also note that the United States considers this resolution
as "intended only" to give the Security Council guidance in acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 40 The use of a maritime interception
zone by a state or states without authorization by the United Nations,
even though less intrusive than blockade, as a measure of economic
coercion in response to an objectionable policy not involving force of
the target state, is subject to attack as unlawful intervention under the
Nicaragua case.4 1 Use of a maritime interception zone as a sanctioning
device by a state without the United Nations' authorization in an en-
37. "Definition of Aggression" Resolution, General Assembly of the United Nations,
Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, Art. 3,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter "Definition of Aggression" Resolution]. For dis-
cussion of "Definition of Aggression" Resolution regarding blockade, see Schmitt, supra
note 31, at 32.
38. "Definition of Aggression" Resolution, supra note 37, at 142, Art 2.
39. Id.
40. Moore, The Use of Force, supra note 31, at 93.
41.
As to the content of the principle in customary law, the Court defines the
constitutive elements which appear relevant in this case: a prohibited intervention
must be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle
of State sovereignty, to decide freely (for example the choice of a political,
economic, social and cultural system, and formulation of foreign policy). In-
tervention is wrongful when it uses, in regard to such choices, methods of
coercion, particularly force, either in the direct form of military action or in
the indirect form of support for subversive activities in another State.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 1, § X, para. 10 n.32
(June 27); see "Definition of Aggression" Resolution, supra note 37, at 142.
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vironment in which economic sanctions are increasingly employed for a
multiplicity of purposes appears to be limited to the Article 51 self-
defense requirement.
2. Neutrality Under the U.N. Charter
The status of neutrality remains possible under the U.N. Charter
only when the Security Council does not act to denominate an aggressor
under Chapter VII. Article 2(5) obligates member states to assist the
United Nations "in any action it takes in accordance with the present
charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against
which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." 42
Article 49 obligates member states to "join in affording mutual assistance
in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. '43
As long as the Security Council does not or cannot engage in
enforcement action under Chapter VII because of the permanent member
veto, member states have no obligation to "discriminate against" an
aggressor and may remain neutral." Theorists speculate that even when
the Security Council does not act, traditional belligerent rights regarding
neutrals have been changed by the U.N. Charter and must be reconciled
with the Article 51 right of self-defense. O'Connell postulates that U.N.
Charter provisions limiting use of force "have deprived belligerents of
the rights which they previously possessed against neutrals, such as the
right of visit and search on the high seas and seizure of contraband. '45
Similarly, Oxford argues that the traditional rights of neutrals are cor-
respondingly limited to conform to the Article 51 right of self-defense.4
Conversely, Ronzitti argues that rights of neutrals remain as established
in the law of war and limit the ability to use force in self-defense under
Article 51.41
42. U.N. Charter art. 2(5).
43. U.N. Charter art. 49. See also U.N. Charter arts. 24(1), 25 and 48 and discussion
in Moore, Enforcing the Rule of Law, supra note 34, at 26.
44. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 76
n.20.
45. D.P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power 160 (1975) (cited in Natalino
Ronzitti, The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed Conflicts at
Sea and the Need for Its Revision, in The Law of Naval Warfare 6 (Natalino Ronzitti
ed. 1988)) [hereinafter Ronzitti, The Crisis in the Law of Naval Warfare]. That the right
of visit and search remains is indicated by the repeated assertion of the right in recent
naval operations. The Cuban quarantine and the Persian Gulf interception are based on
the right of visit and search.
46. T. Oxford, Exclusion Zones at Sea: Some Observations on the Conduct of the
Falkland War 1982, in Sea Changes No. 2, at 94 (1980). See Ronzitti, The Crisis in the
Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 45, at 6.
47. Ronzitti, The Crisis in the Law of Naval Warfare , supra note 45, at 6-7.
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The stronger argument is that traditional belligerent rights survive
to be asserted in conformity with the right to use force under the U.N.
Charter. Correspondingly, those states which assert a neutral status when
the Security Council does not act to denominate an aggressor must assert
their neutral rights consistently with the other party's right to use force
under the U.N. Charter as well. Otherwise, rights under the U.N. Charter
would be secondary to traditional laws of war and would leave the
accomplishments of the U.N. Charter, the outlawing of war and the
limited right to resort to force, in question. States' practice in the Cuban
quarantine, the Vietnam interdiction, and the Persian Gulf interception
support this interpretation. Although the naval operations in all three
instances did not conform to traditional rights of neutrals in that the
belligerent right of visit and search was asserted without a formal dec-
laration of war, the operations complied with the right of self-defense
under Article 51 .48
The Security Council established sanctions against Iraq under Chap-
ter VII by Resolution 661 on August 6, 1990, and adopted Resolution
665 authorizing the force necessary to enforce the sanctions. The Council
"called for strict and complete compliance with the embargo" under
Resolution 670 and, evidently, United Nations members would have been
sanctioned for noncompliance.4 9 Neutral status did not exist regarding
the embargo, and possibly regarding the interception operation itself.
This presents the question whether the MIF could utilize the territorial
seas of nonbelligerents and international straits for the assertion of the
belligerent right of visit and search.10 In practice, some territorial sea
and international strait areas were used by the MIF for interception
duties, but only with permission of the littoral state or otherwise in
accordance with international law.51
C. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Under customary international law, belligerent rights could not be
asserted within neutral territory." Thus, traditionally, naval warfare
48. See Schmitt, supra note 31, at 32 for an opinion in accord with this assertion.
49. Comprehensive Mandatory Sanctions Imposed Against Iraq, U.N. Chron. 7 (Dec.
1990).
50. See U.N. Charter art. 49.
51. Telephone interview with Commander Michael Hinkley JAGC, USN, assigned as
Force Judge Advocate to Commander Middle East Force on board the flagship USS La
Salle in the Persian Gulf from September 1989 to August 1991 (Nov. 1, 1991). Information
regarding which states granted permission to components of the MIF to utilize their
territorial seas remains classified. Id.
52. 1970 Hague Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
in Naval War reprinted in Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of
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could take place only within the territorial seas of belligerents and on
the high seas. 3 The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is interpreted as
not affecting directly the laws of naval warfare. However, the permissible
extension of the three-nautical-mile territorial sea to twelve nautical miles
removes over three million square miles of ocean from hostile action s4
Since the exclusive economic zone and the contiguous zone are recognized
as high seas under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, belligerent
rights such as visit and search may be asserted in these areas off the
coast of nonbelligerent and neutral littoral states."
Article 37 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention allows transit
passage through straits used for international navigation between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part
of the high seas or exclusive economic zone subject to transit passage . 6
Articles 44 and 45 provide there is no suspension of transit passage
through international straits, nor, if applicable, innocent passage under
War 109 (2d ed. 1989).
Article I states: "Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral
Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which would,
if knowingly permitted by any Power, constitute a violation of neutrality." Id.
Article 2 states: "Any act of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the right
of search, committed by belligerent war-ships in the territorial waters of a neutral Power,
constitutes a violation of neutrality and is strictly forbidden." Id.
Article 4 states: "A prize court can not be set up by a belligerent on neutral territory
or on a vessel in neutral waters." Id.
Article 5 states: "Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base
of naval operations against their adversaries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraphy
stations or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with the belligerent forces
on land or sea." Id.
Roberts and Guelff list international agreements which affect neutrality in naval warfare
as the following: 1856 Paris Declaration on maritime law, 1907 Hague Convention VII
on the conversion of merchant ships, 1907 Hague Convention VIII on automatic submarine
mines, 1907 Hague Convention XI on the right of capture, 1907 Hague Convention XII
on an International Prize Court (unratified), 1909 Declaration of London on the laws of
naval war (unratified), and 1949 Geneva Convention II on wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.
Id.
53. Ronzitti, The Crisis in the Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 45, at 13.
54. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea states that the law of war
"continues to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law."
Upon signing the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, Sweden declared that "[i]t is ...
the understanding of the Government of Sweden that the Convention does not affect the
rights and duties of a neutral state provided for in the Convention concerning the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers in case of Naval Warfare (XIII Convention) adopted at
the Hague on 18 October 1907." Ronzitti, The Crisis in the Law of Naval Warfare,
supra note 45, at 30; see also Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook,
supra note 21, at 7-19 n.63.
55. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-19
n.63.
56. Article 37 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. See Annotated
Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 2-18 n.36.
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Article 45 (l)(a) and (b). Therefore, neutral nations cannot hinder or
impede the right of belligerent and neutral surface vessels, submarines,
and aircraft to transit the straits . 7 The duties of transit passage under
Article 39 prohibit belligerent forces from using neutral straits as a
"place of sanctuary or a base of operations," and they must instead
proceed without delay and refrain from the threat or use of force."
Belligerent forces may not engage in visit and search in international
straits.5 9 Similarly, while belligerent ships or aircraft, including submar-
ines, surface warships, and military aircraft, have a right of innocent
passage "through, over and under neutral archipelagic sea lanes" by
Articles 53, 54, and 44 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea, visit and search or other assertion of belligerent rights is not
permitted. 60 An exception to these limitations is established by Articles
1 and 2 of the Hague Convention XIII which allows measures of self-
defense or self help to be undertaken by a belligerent when the neutral
state is unable to eject the opposing belligerent from its waters. 61
D. Law of Armed Conflict Principles
Even though a blockade may conform to the legal requirements as
established in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the 1909 Declaration of
London, the Charter of the United Nations, and the 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, it still must comply with the basic principles
of the law of armed conflict: military necessity, humanity, and pro-
portionality. 62 Simply put, "military necessity" is the permissive variable
which allows measures necessary for bringing war to a conclusion, while
"humanity" is the prohibitive variable which forbids any unnecessary
suffering. 63 Proportionality restricts the level of collateral damage per-
57. Articles 44 and 45 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Even
when a neutral nation closes its territorial waters to belligerent vessels on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis as permitted under Articles 25(3) and 45(2) of the 1982 U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, it may not similarly close the international straits under Article
45(2). See Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-
20.
58. Article 39(1) of the 1982 U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea; Annotated
Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-20.
59. 1907 Hague Convention XIII, art. 5 in Roberts & Guelf, supra note 52; Annotated
Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-20 n.72.
60. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-21
and 7-21 n.76.
61. Id. at 7-21.
62. Naval Justice School, Law of the Sea and Law of Naval Warfare 20 (1987)
[hereinafter Naval Justice School].
63. Id. at 45.
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missible by requiring an "acceptable relation between the legitimate
destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects."
64
III. CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF STATES REGARDING MARITIME
ZONES IN THE HOSTILE SETTING
Prior to World Wars I and II, two basic structures developed to
allow belligerents to deter trade by sea which would aid an enemy during
time of war.65 Blockade, the more drastic measure, permits the total
deprivation of the enemy of all outside commerce by preventing all
ships of any nationality whether belligerent or neutral from entering or
leaving the blockaded coastline or ports. This measure was accomplished
traditionally by stationing ships off the coastline or ports of the enemy
in accordance with the strict requirements of blockade as they developed
during the seventeenth, the eighteenth, and beginning of the nineteenth
centuries.66
Prohibitions against contraband, the other measure, are aimed at
cargo, not ships, and allow the selective "interdiction" or confiscation
of goods which, first, are destined for the enemy and, second, would
be or potentially could be used to support the enemy's war campaign. 67
The belligerent right of visit and search, which supports the practice of
confiscation of contraband, allows a belligerent to stop and inspect
belligerent or neutral merchant vessels, but not warships, outside neutral
territory in order to determine whether the vessel carries contraband or
exempt "free goods," whether the vessel is enemy or neutral, and
whether the vessel is engaged in hostile or belligerent activity.6" The law
64. Id. Notice should be taken of the possibility that the weight of criteria for
measuring the legality of blockade may be changing as the power relationships and the
interactive process reflective of the dissolution of the cold war shifts to accommodate the
"new world" configuration. This may be especially true of the economic blockade or
interdiction because of the heightened awareness of and emphasis on human rights or
"human values" accompanying the changing order. The "acceptable relation" between
legitimate damage and collateral damage may shift correspondingly to reflect a decreased
acceptable range of damage to the civilian component during armed conflict.
65. Horace B. Robertson, The Law of the Sea, in National Security Law, supra note
31, at 733.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook, supra note 21, at 7-6.
Traditionally, the right of visit and search is not an act of war but a belligerent right
which can "only be exercised after the outbreak, and before the end of war." 2 Lassa
Oppenheim, International Law § 415, at 848 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952) [hereinafter
Oppenheim]. Yet, "visitation is not an act of warfare .... " Id. at 849.
Visitation is "not an independent right," but exists to support other belligerent rights.
Lauterpacht states that visitation is involved in "the right of either belligerent ... to
punish neutral vessels breaking blockade, carrying contraband, and rendering non-neutral
service. It is a right, in contradistinction to the duty, of every belligerent to visit an
enemy merchant man if he desires to capture her." Id. at 849 n.1 (emphasis in original).
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of contraband permits the capture and condemnation of contraband if
it is destined for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or
to the armed forces of the enemy. 69 Blockade, on the other hand, prevents
both imports into and exports out of enemy territory. 70 Whereas a
blockade, in order to conform to the traditional requirements of blockade
set forth in the London Declaration of 1909, must be confined to a
specifically identified area and subject to the requirement that the block-
ade not bar access to neutral ports, the interdiction of contraband,
supported by the belligerent right of visit and search could occur any-
where outside of neutral territory.7'
A. World War I and World War II
New technological developments available during World War I in
weaponry and naval warfare techniques, specifically new mines, sub-
marines, torpedoes, and aircraft, prevented states from maintaining the
"traditional" close-in blockade with its legal characteristics. 72 Surface
vessels stationed within a limited area were too vulnerable to attack.
Instead, massive sea areas were patrolled by surface vessels, and U-
boats, or submarines. Wide areas were mined by both sides in an attempt
to control ingress and egress from the coastline throughout the European
continent. Theorists speculated that the close blockade had become ob-
solete.73 The World War I long-distance blockades of the British and
the war zones of the Germans departed from the legal requirements of
blockade: establishment, notice, effectiveness, impartial application, and
specific, limited area. The British patrolled extensive sea zones and
required all trade passing through such areas, whether destined for enemy
69. 1909 London Declaration Concerning the Laws of War, art. 30, Feb. 26, 1909,
published in 3 Am. J. Int'l L. 179-220 (Supp. 1909) (Fr. and Eng.).
Contraband is the "designation of such goods as are forbidden by either belligerent
to be carried to the enemy on the ground that they enable him to carry on the war with
greater vigor." Oppenheim, supra note 68, § 391, at 799. Tucker explains:
[I]t has long been customary to characterize the problems arising with respect
to neutral commerce in terms of two conflicting rights: the right of the neutral
state to insist upon continued freedom of commerce for its subjects despite the
existence of war and the right of the belligerent to prevent neutral subjects from
affording assistance to the military effort of an enemy.
Robert W. Tucker, International Law Studies: The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea
1965 (1955).
70. Kalshoven, supra note 20, at 262.
71. Robertson, supra note 65, at 733. See Oppenheim, supra note 68, at 848-61.
72. Carter, supra note 20, at 42-44.
73. Id.; Robertson, supra note 20, at 289-90.
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ports or neutral ports, to proceed to allied ports for a search for
contraband which, if found, was confiscated. 74 The British established
designated "mined areas" in reprisal to destroy German submarines
operating in violation of the Hague Convention VIII. Within German
war zones, both belligerent and neutral merchant vessels were destroyed
by unrestricted warfare and scattered mines and, in contrast to the
British practice of designating safe routes for neutral commercial ship-
ping, Germany designated no safe routes.
During World War II, the British again established "long distance
blockade" zones in the Atlantic whereas Germany resorted to "war
zones" in the waters off Britain and France. While Germany initially
warned neutral nations that passage even by neutrals through these zones
was dangerous, and while German submarines initially allowed targeted
vessels' crews to abandon ship, indiscriminate "attack without warning"
on neutral and belligerent shipping became the German practice. The
British tightened this control over neutral trade by instituting the Navicert
system, which required neutral trade to obtain British certification of
cargo and routes or risk interception, seizure, and, probably, condem-
nation. 7 German war zones were enforced by aircraft and undisclosed
mine fields. The illegality of British long-distance blockades of World
Wars I and II has been excused by some theorists as reprisals against
the clearly illegal German war zones. 76 The practices of World Wars I
and II not only deviated substantially from the form and procedures
as established by the traditional law of war but, in doing so, substantially
diminished the rights of neutrals. The total economic war required the
cutting off of all exports and imports alike because either could support
74. Maxwell Jenkins, Attacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Gulf: The Legality
of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone and Iranian Reprisals, 8 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 517,
529 (1985); Oppenheim, supra note 68, at 791-95.
75. Jenkins, supra note 74, at 531. Oppenheim, supra note 68, at 791-95.
76. "So neutrals who do not prevent one belligerent from unlawfully obstructing
commercial intercourse between his opponent and themselves cannot complain if that
opponent replies by resorting to measures designed to stop intercourse between the first
belligerent and neutrals. The rule that belligerents must not interfere with the legitimate
commerce of neutrals presupposes that both belligerents will carry it out, and that neutrals
will prevent both of them from violating it. If on the contrary, neutrals acquiesce in or
are unable to prevent the violation of this rule by one belligerent to the vital disadvantage
of the other belligerent, the latter cannot be expected to suffer this without redress, and
must be excused if, in retaliating upon the enemy, he also violates the rule." Oppenheim,
supra note 68, at 679.
"[Tjhe object of the Order [in Council Regulating a System of Passes for approved
cargoes and ships of July 31, 1940] was, precisely, as a legitimate act of reprisals, to
simplify the conduct of the blockade and to put increased pressure on the enemy." 10
M. Whiteman 906 (1968) (citing Fitzmaurice, Some Aspects of Modern Contraband Control
and The Law Of Prize, 22 Brit. Yb. Int'l L. 73, 87-89 (1945)).
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the enemy's ability to wage war.7 7 The category of conditional contraband
was enlarged to include everything except insignificant luxury items. 71
The difference between absolute and conditional contraband disappeared
so that everything was subject to capture. 79 The doctrine of continuous
voyage expanded to allow interdiction of what was once conditional
contraband as well as absolute contraband. 0
B. Post- World War II Developments
1. North Korea Blockade
The blockade of North Korea marked a return to the classic form
of the close blockade in that all legal requirements of establishment,
notification, effectiveness, and impartiality were met.81 An announcement
of the blockade of North Korea was broadcast on July 4, 1950, "to
all shipping in the Pacific Ocean." Blockade lines extended 39 degrees-
35 minutes North on the west coast, and 41 degrees-51 minutes North
on the east coast of the Korean peninsula.82 These dimensions were
established to circumvent confrontations with Soviet or Chinese vessels.8 3
Officially designated "United Nations Blockading and Escort Force,"
the U.N. Naval Force was composed of vessels from ten nations, in-
cluding the United States, Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Thai-
land, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Republic
of Korea. 84 The blockade of North Korea demonstrated, first, that a
77. Richard Grunawalt, The Rights of Neutrals and Belligerents, 19 Ocean Dev. &
Int'l L.J. 299 (1988).
78. Walter L. Williams, Jr., Neutrality in Modern Armed Conflicts: A Survey of the
Developing Law, 90 Mil. L. Rev. 9, 43 (1980).
79. Boleslaw Adam Boczek, Law of Warfare at Sea and Neutrality: Lessons from
the Gulf War, 20 Ocean Dev. and Int'l L.J. 239, 261 (1989). Before seizure, cargo must
be determined to be bound for the enemy either directly or by transshipment.
80. Id.
81. Robertson, supra note 20, at 290.
82. Malcolm W. Cagle & Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea 281 (1957). The
notice stated, "The President of the United States, in keeping with the United Nations
Security Council's request for support to the Republic of Korea in repelling the Northern
Korean invaders and restoring peace in Korea, has ordered a naval blockade of the Korean
coast." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 294. Two blockade forces under Task Force 95 prevented passage of all
ships to the ports of North Korea, including Soviet and Chinese warships, with the
exception of nonbelligerent warships in order to reduce the possibility of confrontation
with major powers. Id. Four ships operating in pairs from the 38th parallel to 41 degrees
-50 minutes North on the east coast, and U.S. and U.K. carriers near the 39th parallel
and shore patrols along the west maintained surveillance of the coastline once every twenty-
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traditional close blockade was still feasible in regional conflicts not-
withstanding modern technology, and second, that a blockade could be
enforced effectively with national navies cooperating under an integrated
command.
2. Cuban Quarantine
Professor Robertson states that the Cuban missile crisis "perhaps
had the greatest influence on the further development of maritime in-
terdiction" and finds, based on similarity of form, that the Persian
interdiction "appears ... to be patterned after the . . . 'quarantine."'" 5
The Cuban quarantine was necessitated by the installation in summer
of 1962 of Soviet military equipment, including medium range ballistic
missiles with a capable range of one thousand nautical miles, jet bombers,
and Soviet support crews, in Cuba. 6 On October 23, 1962, the Council
of the Organization of American States (OAS) met, and as the Pro-
visional Organ of Consultation, adopted a resolution which "recom-
mended" that "the member states ... take all measures, individually
and collectively including the use of armed force" to stop the transport
of additional offensive weapons into Cuba.87
Kennedy issued a presidential proclamation of a quarantine based
on this resolution as permitted under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter
rather than on the Article 51 inherent right of individual or collective
self defense."8 The Proclamation proclaimed the area of interdiction
four hours by sea. Id. at 303.
Although the possibility of overland supply existed, North Korea was denied supply
through "(1) . . . deep-water shipping along the east coast; (2) .. .shallow-water coastal
shipping on the west coast; (3) . . . deep-water shipping routes to the Asiatic seaport
cities in China, Manchuria, and North Korea." Id. at 370. In addition, a continuous
siege of the ports of Wonsan, Songjin, and Hungnam was accomplished. Id. at 370-71.
85. Robertson, supra note 20, at 296.
86. Neill H. Alford, Jr., Modern Economic Warfare, 1963 International Law Studies
Vol. 56, 277 (1967). Additional missiles and supporting military equipment were being
shipped to the Soviet Union by Cuba while intermediate range ballistic missile sites were
being constructed. Id.
87. Robertson, supra note 20, at 291. The resolution is based on Arts. 3, 6, and 8
of the Rio de Janiero Treaty of 1947. These articles permitted the taking of measures,
including the use of force, in the event of any aggression against "the territory or
sovereignty of an American state." Von Glahn, supra note 34, at 511.
88. Von Glahn, supra note 34, at 511. A strong defense of the action under Article
51 has been made by McDougal and others, See McDougal, supra note 35. Robertson,
supra note 20, at 9. The defense is based on a right of anticipatory self-defense as part
of an inherent right of self-defense which survives under Article 51 of the Charter. Id.
Some commentators have argued that the ICJ interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter
as requiring an armed attack for individual or collective self-defense would not allow the
quarantine under the circumstances of 1962. However, the court specifically did not address
the right of anticipatory self-defense. A.V. Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations and Contemporary Law of the Sea, 64 Naval War C. Int'l L.
Stud. 109, 128 (Robertson ed. 1991); Robertson, supra note 20, at 292.
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encompassed an area formed from a circle with a radius of five hundred
miles centered on Havana and a second circle with a radius of five
hundred miles centered on the eastern end of Cuba.s9
The Secretary of Defense was ordered to
employ land, sea and air forces [and to] interdict ... prohibited
material ... [defined as] surface to surface missiles; bomber
aircraft; bombs, air to surface rockets and guided missiles; war-
heads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic
equipment to support or operate the above items; ... for the
purpose of effectuating this Proclamation. °
Ultimately, the administration defended its action as not subject to the
Article 53(1) requirement of Security Council authorization by arguing
that as based on a resolution "recommending" action, armed force was
not "obligatory" and not an enforcement action.9'
Analyzing the concept on which the quarantine is based reveals the
basis and, hence, legality of the form of Persian Gulf interception at
least prior to, if not subsequent to, the authorization by the United
Nations. The Pacific blockade provides for the quarantine, the precedent
of a blockade operation, in time of peace. The quarantine operation
differs from the Pacific blockade in at least two ways. First, the ships
of a third state, the Soviet Union, as well as those of the target state,
Cuba, were affected. 92 Second, the quarantine was an "interdiction" of
cargo, not vessels. As such, the quarantine is based conceptually on the
law of contraband supported by the right of visit and search. 93
Clearly the Cuban quarantine was a limited, reasonable use of force,
specific and 'selective in its objectives, and while it adequately com-
89. Robertson, supra note 20, at 291.
90. Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, Proclamation No.
3504, Oct. 23, 1962, 3 C.F.R. 232, 233-34 (1959-63); Robertson, supra note 20, at 291.
91. Robertson, supra note 20, at 291-92 (citing Leonard C. Meeker, Defensive Quar-
antine and the Law, 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 515 (1967)); See also John Norton Moore, Law
and the Indo-China War 334 (1972) [hereinafter Moore, The Indo-China War].
92. Von Glahn, supra note 34, at 508. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 292. However,
interdicting the vessels of the Soviet Union was reasonable because the Soviet Union was
one of the parties to the dispute.
Dispute exists regarding the lawfulness of hindering passage of the vessels of a third
nation. Lauterpacht maintains that there exists agreement that the vessels of third states
may not be seized and sequestrated; however, "no unanimity exists" regarding whether
the ships of a third state may be stopped. Oppenheim, supra, note 68, at 147.
93. Further, as Janis argues, "the point is that doctrine and practice no longer try
to decide what is formally 'war' and what is formally 'peace.' There are simply conflicts
between nations which involve the use of force and/or economic sanctions." Mark W.
Janis, The Law of Naval Operations: Neutrality, 64 U.S. Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud.
148 (1981).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
municated to the Soviet Union and Cuba an intent not to wage war,
it also was the first of a possible series of escalating measures.9 4
3. Blockade of North Vietnam
The mining of North Vietnam's harbors marked a return to the
traditional blockade except that mines were used as the enforcement
device. During the Tet Offensive, the North Vietnamese were unable to
resupply effectively from South Vietnam's coastal waters because of
"Operation Market-Time," a military course of action in which a de-
fensive sea zone was patrolled jointly by the U.S. Navy and the South
Vietnamese, forcing a greater North Vietnamese dependence on overland
supply via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. After fierce attack from the North
and the refusal of Le Duc Tho to negotiate in Paris, Nixon ordered
the mining of Haiphong Harbor and other North Vietnamese harbors
to prevent the flow of "Soviet supplies at the source." 95
On May 8, 1972, squadrons of A-6s from three carriers sowed mine
fields in Haiphong, Hon Lai, and Can Pha in the North and Thanh
hoa, Vinh Quang Khe, and Dong Hoi in the South.9 The mining of
the harbors was effective. Vice Admiral William P. Mack, Commander
of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet stated, "What happened was that all
that traffic into Vietnam, except across the Chinese border stopped.
Within ten days there was not a missile or a shell being fired at us
from the beach. The North Vietnamese ran out of ammunition, just as
we always said they would." 91
The U.S. Navy's instructional manual, Law of the Sea and Law of
Naval Warfare, describes the "textbook" legality of this operation stat-
ing,
The following precautions . . . were taken by the United States:
in an address on 3 May the [P]resident announced details of
the mining; notices were issued to all mariners; a letter was sent
to the U.N. Security Council; and bilateral approaches were
made through diplomatic channels to countries concerned. Each
of these communications detailed the protective measures taken,
which included the facts that delayed-activation mines only were
to be used so that ships in Vietnamese harbors had three days
in which to leave, and U.S. and Republic of Vietnam warships
were to notify each ship approaching the internal and claimed
94. Bruce A. Clark, Recent Evolutionary Trends Concerning Naval Interdiction of
Seaborne Commerce as a Viable Sanctioning Device 27 JAG J. 160 (1973).
95. P. Mersky & Norman Polmar, The Naval Air War in Vietnam 198-99 (1981).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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territorial waters of North Vietnam. In addition, no mines were
laid in international waters and the mining did not bar access
to or departure from neutral. coasts.9
Much controversy existed regarding the use of mines to enforce the
blockade. However, the extremely limited nature of the blockade coun-
terbalanced the lack of selectivity and discrimination in targeting. 99 The
extensive notification of the blockade, the grace period, and the con-
finement of mines to the harbors and territorial waters of North Vietnam
ensured that any challenge of the blockade was on an informed and
voluntary basis.'00 The deterrent effect of the operation was so successful
that all shipping ceased with no injury to life or property reported
during the operation.'0 This demonstrates that highly destructive means
of enforcement may be acceptable and lawful if other aspects of the
blockade limit the likelihood of destruction.
4. Blockade of Iran-Iraq War
The Iran-Iraq War brought attention once again to the use and
meaning of war zones and exclusion zones. After the start of the war
on September 22, 1980, Iran declared an exclusion zone which encom-
passed virtually the whole of the Iranian coast on the eastern coastline
of the Persian Gulf. 0 2 In response Iraq established a "prohibited war
zone" north of 29 degrees-3 minutes North in the Persian Gulf, along
Iran's northern coastline, and within the lines of the Iranian exclusion
zone with all ships in the vicinity of Kharg Island subject to attack. 0 3
The zones were utilized by each to wage economic warfare on the other.
In order to disrupt oil exports from Iran, on which the Iranian economy
is heavily dependent, Iraq attacked ships in the northern end of the
Persian Gulf largely within the declared war zone from 1981 until 1984
98. Naval Justice School, supra note 62, at 65. Horace Robertson notes that the use
of mines as an "enforcement device" might violate the "principle of distinction" in that
damage would be incurred by vessels regardless of nationality or cargo. He argues, however,
that because of the extensive warning, no neutral vessel would have entered the mined
waters without choice. Robertson, supra note 20, at 292.
99. Clark, supra note 94, at 160.
100. Id.
101. Mersky & Polmar, supra note 95, at 198-99.
102. Robertson, supra note 20, at 293. The area is described as running "from the
Strait [of Hormuz] to 12-NMs South of each of Abu Musa Island, Sirri Island, Cable
Bank Light, and Farsi Island, then Southwest of Kharg Island along fixed points." Francis
V. Russo, Neutrality at Sea in Transition: State Practice in the Gulf War as Emerging
International Customary Law, 19 Ocean Dev. & Int'l L.J. 381, 389 (1988).
103. Id. at 390.
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and, subsequent to 1984, neutral ships traversing the northern end of
the Persian Gulf to and from Kharg Island.'04 Iraq's terminals had been
destroyed by Iran prior to 1980, and there had been little commercial
shipping from Iraq since that time. Iran, for a lack of Iraqi shipping
targets, instead indiscriminately attacked neutral ships traveling to and
from neutral states.105 Further, the Iranian attacks were not confined to
any exclusion or war zones and tended to concentrate in the southern
end of the Persian Gulf outside of the Iranian declared exclusion zone.'06
The indiscriminate attack and destruction of neutral shipping by both
countries, particularly Iran, and the mining of international shipping
lanes by Iran, show a total disregard for the international law rights
of neutrals. 10 7
The Tanker War is significant regarding maritime interception in
two areas. First, the United Nations Security Council acknowledged the
rights of neutral nations to engage in shipping when the Security Council
has not denominated an aggressor. Further, according to theorist Francis
Russo, Jr., Security Council resolutions establish a "baseline standard"
that "all neutral [third-party state] commercial vessels engaged in legit-
imate trade with states not parties to the hostilities-whether neutral or
non-belligerent-are treated as enjoying equal legal immunity from bel-
ligerent attack." 08
Commentators draw a distinction between the traditional neutral
state and the merely non-belligerent or "state not a party to the hos-
tilities."' 1 9 During World War II different degrees of support were given
by nonparticipants to belligerents, ranging from absolute non-involve-
ment to active support without actual engagement in hostilities." 0 Mem-
bers of the Gulf Cooperation Council, notably Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
supported Iraq by financing its war with Iran."' Cash grants used to
purchase Soviet arms were allocations of profit derived from oil ex-
ports. "' 2 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were not neutral in their financial
104. W.J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device and the Law of Naval Warfare, 24
Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 119 (1986). See Robertson, supra note 20, at 293.
105. Fenrick, supra note 104, at 119. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 293-94.
106. Russo, supra note 102, at 390.
107. Id.. David L. Peace, Major Maritime Events in the Persian Gulf, 82 Am. Soc'y
Int'l L. Proc. 146, 153 (1988).
108. See Russo, supra note 102, at 381, 396 for discussion of these points.
109. "State and extra-state practice in the Gulf War has also reaffirmed for genuine
intraneutral shipping (i.e., that between third party States outside the Gulf and those
Gulf states not parties to the hostilities, which does not in any case directly enhance the
economic war strength of one or the other belligerents) a right of privileged states that
strictly limits the circumstances under which belligerent interference with it will be accorded
legitimacy." Russo, supra note 102, at 381.
110. Boczek, supra note 79, at 259.
111. Id.
112. Russo, supra note 102, at 393.
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support of Iraq, even though they did not actually participate in hos-
tilities. In calling for protection of shipping of third party nations to
and from these states, the Security Council Resolutions 540, 552, and
582 do not distinguish between rights "which may be enjoyed by ships
trading with states that are neutrals in the traditional sense and states
pursuing a policy of non-belligerency.Y
1 3
Second, the right of visit and search was reaffirmed. Iran asserted
the right of visit and search from 1985 to 1988, stopping as many as
fifteen to twenty vessels a day."4 The United States did not deny the
right of visit and search to Iran, but convoyed U.S. shipping and eleven
reflagged Kuwaiti vessels." 5 France "resisted" the visit and search at-
tempts by Iran, while Great Britain, refusing to recognize visit and
search as a belligerent right, conceded the right to visit and search.
1 6
The British conceded the right under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
stating,
Iran, actively engaged in an armed conflict, is entitled in exercise
of its inherent right of self-defense to stop and search a foreign
merchant ship on the high seas, if there is a reasonable ground
for suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for
use in the conflict. 117
The British, consistent with their previous position opposing the right
of convoying warships to deny a physical visit and search to a belligerent,
allowed visit and search even though British warships "accompanied,"
but did not "escort" British flag ships."18
IV. PERSIAN GULF INTERCEPTION
A. Facts of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi Crisis
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwait-Iraqi border,
plundered and ransacked the country, installed a "Provisional Free
Government of Kuwait," and remained to occupy Kuwait based on an
"invitation" allegedly issued to Iraq by the "Free Provisional Govern-
113. Id. at 395.
114. Boczek, supra note 79, at 260.
115. Robertson, supra note 20, at 293. Rather than submit to visit and search, these
convoying nations would have the convoying warship inspect and certify the lack of
contraband to the party attempting the visit and search. Id.
116. Id.; Grunawalt, supra note 77, at 159.
117. Robertson, supra note 20, at 293-94 (citing Christopher Greenwood, Remarks at
the 82nd Annual Meeting, Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 158, 159 (1988)).
118. Russo, supra note 102, at 16; Robertson, supra note 20, at 293.
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ment of Kuwait." 11 9 The world reaction was immediate and intense. The
Security Council met before dawn on August 2 to adopt Resolution 660
which "condemned the Iraqi invasion" of Kuwait, "demanded" that
Iraq withdraw "immediately and unconditionally" from Kuwait, and
called upon Iraq and Kuwait to "begin immediately intensive negotiations
to resolve their differences." 2 0
On August 6, the Security Council adopted Resolution 661 which
imposed comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on Iraq. 2' The purpose
of Resolution 661 was "to secure compliance of Iraq with Resolution
660 calling for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces" and "to restore the
authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait."'12 2 A total embargo
was imposed on Iraq with an exemption explicitly included for "medical
supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs. 1 23 Notably,
the resolution in its preamble affirms "the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against
Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter" and, in paragraph
9, states that "nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance
to the legitimate Government of Kuwait."'2 4
On August 16, 1990, the United States announced that U.S. forces
were commencing intercept operations to challenge ships in enforcement
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 661. By letter to the President of
the Security Council, the United States informed the Security Council
that the U.S. military forces "at the request of the Government of
Kuwait" had joined Kuwait "to intercept the vessels seeking to engage
in trade with Iraq or Kuwait in violation of the mandatory sanctions
imposed in Security Council resolution 661 .- ,12 These actions were taken
"in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter."'' 26 Further the letter
informs the Security Council that the United States will "use force only
if necessary and then only in a manner proportionate to prevent vessels
from violating such trade sanctions contained in Resolution 661.11' 27 A
119. U.N. Acts, U.N. Chron., at 9, 10 (Dec. 1990). For comprehensive chronology
of events, see Robertson, supra note 20, at 294-97; Moore, Enforcing the Rule of Law,
supra note 34, at 100-08.
120. U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
121. U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
122. Id.; U.N. Acts, supra note 119, at 12.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Letter from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/21537 (1990),
reprinted in The Kuwait Crisis-Basic Document 247 (E. Lauterpacht et al. eds, 1991)
[hereinafter Letter from the Charge d'affairesl.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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U.S. Department of Defense press release of the same date indicated
in addition that this was a multinational effort and that intercept op-
erations would be concentrated "in specified zones in the Persian Gulf,
the Gulf of Oman, and the Red Sea." '
These announcements were followed on August 17 by Special Warn-
ing No. 80 issued by the U.S. Department of the Navy. The Special
Warning describes the interception operation as follows:
2. Effected [sic] areas include the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of
Tiran, and other choke points, key point ports, and oil pipe
line terminals. Specifically, Persian Gulf interception efforts will
be concentrated in international waters south of 27 degrees north
latitude; Red Sea interception efforts will be conducted in in-
ternational waters north of 22 degrees north latitude.
3. All merchant ships perceived to be proceeding to or from
Iraqi or Kuwaiti ports, or transshipment points, and carrying
embargoed material to or from Iraq or Kuwait, will be inter-
cepted and may be searched.
4. Ships which, after being intercepted, are determined to be
proceeding to or from Iraq or Kuwait ports, or transshipment
points, and carrying embargoed material to or from Iraq or
Kuwait, will not be allowed to proceed with their planned
transit....
7. Failure of a ship to proceed as directed will result in the
minimum level of force necessary to ensure compliance.
8. Any ships, including waterborne craft and armed merchant
ships, or aircraft, which threaten or interfere with U.S. forces
engaged in enforcing this maritime interception will be considered
hostile 129
Great Britain notified the Security Council that exercising "the in-
herent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized in Article
51," the British Government had deployed military forces to the Gulf. 30
By August 15, Great Britain and Australia had agreed to join the United
128. U.S. Department of Defense, press release concerning naval interdiction, Aug.
16, 1990; U.S. Department of Defense, Desert Shield No. 10, memorandum for corre-
spondence, Aug. 16, 1990, reprinted in Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, supra note 125,
at 247 [hereinafter Desert Shield memorandum].
129. U.S. Department of the Navy, Special Warning No. 80, Aug. 17, 1990, reprinted
in Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, supra note 125, at 245 [hereinafter Special Warning].
130. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/21501 (1990), reprinted in Basic Documents, supra note 125, at
248.
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States in intercepting and boarding ships suspected of violating Reso-
lution 661.131 On the other hand, France, Malaysia, the Soviet Union,
and Canada were not supportive of the interception operation. These
nations argued that, because interception could require use of force, the
interception should be undertaken by the Security Council only.13 2 Fur-
ther, France and Canada did not wish to become "co-belligerents" with
those nations conducting the interception. 3  Perhaps most damaging was
the statement by U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar that the law-
fulness of the interception "would depend on whether the action taken
by the American government had been approved by the Security
Council.' 134
Most criticism was quelled by the adoption of Resolution 665 on
August 25, 1990, which endorsed the naval interception operation in
the Persian Gulf. By this resolution, the Security Council "called upon
[states] cooperating with the Gulf government of Kuwait which are
employing maritime forces to the area [to] use such measures commen-
surate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the
authority of the Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime
shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations"
so that Resolution 661 would be strictly implemented.' The resolution
further "requests" states to provide "assistance as may be required"
by those states conducting the interception. 3 6 Even though interpretation
of Resolution 665 differs among even the Security Council members,
the interception was clearly authorized by the Security Council under
its Chapter VII powers.3 7
131. Olivia Ward, Who Will Command the Foreign Forces Gathering in Gulf., The
Toronto Star, Aug. 15, 1990, at A3.
132. Olivia Ward, Only UN Had Right to Call for Blockade, Canada Declares, The
Toronto Star, Aug. 14, 1990, at A3.
133. Paul Lewis, Confrontation in the Gulf, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at 9; Ward,
supra note 131, at A3.
134. Paul Lewis, U.N. Chief Argues Blockade Is Hasty, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1990,
at A12.
135. U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
136. Id.
137. Elaine Scioliono, Putting Teeth in an Embargo: How the U.S. Convinced the
U.N., N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1990, at Al. (China interpreted the resolutions as not
authorizing force).
Resolution 666 adopted by the Security Council on September 13, 1990, established a
sanctions committee composed of the members of the U.N. Security Council to monitor
any shortage of food in Iraq and Kuwait and the needs of those who might be specially
effected including children under the age of fifteen, pregnant women, new mothers, and
the sick and the elderly. Council Acts on Hunger and Suffering, U.N. Chron., at 18
(Dec. 1990). U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (1990), reprinted in Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents,
supra note 125, at 91.
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In endorsing the interception operation, the Security Council charted
a new path in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and provided a precedent,
if not a model, for future sanction operations under Chapter VII.
Nations, regional organizations, and the United Nations are turning
increasingly to sanctions in order to enforce international law and redress
international wrongs.
B. Lawfulness of the Persian Gulf Interception
The interception as initially established by the United States on
August 16, 1991, and subsequent to its endorsement by the Security
Council under Resolution 665 was undertaken properly as a measure of
collective self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 3 8 The
Security Council lawfully endorsed the interception by Resolution 665
in accordance with U.N. Charter provisions.'39 Professor John Norton
Moore finds that "[n]ecessity ... is paradigmatically met in a setting
in which aggression is aimed at the separate existence of an independent
member nation of the United Nations and that entire nation is under
brutal occupation.' 140 Sanctions were strongly supported by the world
community as necessary and appropriate. If the imposition of sanctions
is proportional, then it follows that sanctions which are firm are pro-
portional. 41 Proportionality is established further by the limited nature
of the interception operation. The interception activities were designed
strictly to enforce the sanctions and to use as coercion an intimidating
threat of force with limited use of disabling force as a last resort.
The interception, as initially established by the United States on
August 16, 1991, and as endorsed by the Security Council under Res-
olution 665, complied and continues to comply with applicable principles
of international law regarding maritime zones in hostile settings. Res-
olution 665 places no restrictions on the form of the interception except
to require that "all inward and outward maritime shipping" shall be
halted "to inspect and verify cargoes and destinations" with the pro-
portionality requirement that only "measures commensurate to the spe-
cific circumstances as may be necessary" be applied.' 42 Form and use
of force were otherwise left to the discretion of the participating nations.
Lauterpacht implies that because of obligations of both member and
138. Moore, Enforcing the Rule of Law, supra note 34, at 100-08; see Letter from
the Charge d' Affaires, supra note 125 ("These actions are being taken by the United
States in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense,
recognized in Article 51 of the Charter").
139. Moore, supra note 34, at 100-08.
140. Id. at 106.
141. Id.
142. U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
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non-member states, a naval operation established under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter is not required to conform to the strictures of blockade
or other traditional forms of maritime zones. 43 Regardless, the form of
interception imposed in the Persian Gulf initially by the United States
and endorsed by the United Nations is a more limited, less intrusive
naval operation than the traditional visit and search, blockade, or Pacific
blockade and complies with international law.
The interception was not a blockade for its objective was not to
block the enemy coast .'for the purpose of' preventing ingress and
egress of vessels."'" The interception was directed at cargo, not ships,
and may be considered a use of the right of visit and search in the
further development of the law of contraband.' 45 The requirements for
a lawful blockade struck a balance between the rights of belligerents
and the rights of neutrals and restricted the blockade to as limited an
infringement of freedom of the seas as possible while still allowing an
effective action. The recent concept of interception strikes a balance
between freedom of the seas and interference which favors nonprohibited
shipping to an even greater degree. The interception is, in form, at least
as limited in its restrictions on traditional high seas freedoms as blockade
and related naval operations.'" Rather than being captured, vessels
carrying prohibited cargo were diverted to nonprohibited ports. Vessels
were allowed to sail to "transshipment points" as long as adequate
documentation of cargo proved that the cargo was not destined for
Kuwait or Iraq. 47
As allowed by the concept of Pacific blockade and as in the case
of the Cuban quarantine, the interception was not asserted as an act
of war, but was intended to settle differences outside of war. However,
unlike the interception, Pacific blockade allowed vessels of the state
under Pacific blockade to be "seized and sequestrated" to be "restored"
at the end of the blockade.' 4
143. Oppenheim, supra note 68, at 149.
144. Id. at 768.
145. Robertson sets forth two major concepts in naval warfare: blockade and con-
traband. Robertson, supra note 65, at 733.
146. Alford finds that "the legitimacy" of an act is a product of persuasion since
the collection of values and institutions we describe as law are in a process constantly
of reconstruction." Alford, supra note 86, at 292.
147. Delery, supra note 1, at 66.
148. Oppenheim, supra note 68, at 148. Although unclear, some theorists assert the
blockading state could lawfully "stop" the vessels of third nations. Lauterpacht sets forth
certain requirements for Pacific blockade. Negotiations to settle the dispute must fail.
The blockading state must notify its intention to blockade the target state and set forth
the day and hour of its commencement. Finally, Pacific blockades must be effective. Id.
at 148-49.
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The Persian Gulf interception process itself indicates that the meas-
ures undertaken to enforce the interception satisfy the "commensurate
with the specific circumstances" standard to halt shipping. 149 Controls
were built into the process to allow the minimum possible application
of force needed. Basically, vessels intercepted departing Iraq with "pro-
hibited cargo" were required to return to Iraq. Those vessels attempting
to reach Iraq with "prohibited cargo" were allowed to "return to their
ports of origin or select non-prohibited ports."'' 0 The "quick, rather
painless process" used in the Persian Gulf interdiction is briefly described
as follows:
1. The intercepted vessel is asked to respond concerning "its
registration, cargo, and ports of call.""'
2. If carrying "prohibited cargo" to Iraq, the vessel is "given
the option of diverting to a port other than one in Iraq ...
in lieu of being boarded and searched."'12
3. If the vessel refuses to divert and refuses to be boarded, then
SEAL and Marine teams will "board and secure" the merchant
vessel."'
This is accomplished by having a frigate from the allied
force "try to force the vessel to slow" by maneuvering "across
her bow." Warning shots are fired in sequence across the bow
of the resisting vessel. Low-level passes are made by F-14 and
F/A-18 aircraft. If this fails, then a helicopter gunship will
provide fire cover while a team of Marines will be placed on
board by a second helicopter.1 4
4. A boarding team will then approach in small boats and board
the vessel.' "Special team" Coast Guard Law Enforcement
Detachments ("LEDETS") trained in the "boarding and search"
process are a part of this team. 56
5. If the "embarking team" finds prohibited cargo on board
and the ship's master refuses to divert, then the boarding team
149. Ambassador A-Ashtal of Yemen criticizes the latitude given under the resolution
saying, "According to the wording of the draft resolution, every maritime state with a
presence in the area would have the right to undertake whatever acts it deems fit, and
I believe that this could detract from the Security Council's role of directing and supervising
such acts .... For these reasons, we cannot vote in favour of the draft resolution ...."
Statement of Amb. AI-Ashtal, U.N. Doc. E. S/PV.2938 (1990), reprinted in The Kuwait
Crisis: Basic Documents, supra note 125, at 116.
150. Delery, supra note 1, at 66.
151. Id. at 67.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 68.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 71.
156. Id. at 68.
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will "take control of the ship and force its diversion to another
port.' 57
These measures are described by Commander Delery, one of several
MIF officers assigned to the staff of Commander Middle East Force,
as having "precluded the use of crippling force."'58 Even though a total
of 12,648 vessels have been challenged to date, disabling fire has never
been used and no ships have been disabled.' 59
Resolution 665, paragraph I calls on intercepting forces "to halt all
inward and outward maritime shipping . . . ." The Security Council does
not specify the area where interception may take place.160 However broad
the latitude given to participating nations under Resolution 665, by
Special Warning No. 80, the United States specifically and precisely
identified the area of operations upon its August 16, 1990, unilateral
imposition of the maritime interception to
include the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Tiran, and other choke
ports, key ports and oil pipeline terminals. Specifically Persian
Gulf interception efforts will be concentrated in international
157. Id.
158. Id. at 71. Lauterpacht acknowledges that not "all the details of" the formalities
of visit and search are established in international law, but state practice has been consistent
on numerous points. The U.S. Navy's Commander's Handbook sets forth a procedure
similar to that ascertained by Lauterpacht as follows:
2. Before summoning a vessel to lie to, the warship should hoist its national
flag. The summons is made by firing a blank charge, by international flag signal
... or by recognized means....
3. If the summoned vessel takes flight, she may be pursued and brought to by
forcible measures if necessary.
4. When a summoned vessel has been brought to, the warship should send a
boat with an officer to conduct the visit and search .... The officer(s) and
boat crew may be armed at the discretion of the commanding officer.
5. If visit and search at sea is deemed hazardous or impracticable, the neutral
vessel may be escorted by the summoning of another U.S. Navy warship or by
a U.S. military aircraft to the nearest place (outside neutral territory) where the
visit and search may be conveniently and safely conducted. ...
6. The boarding officer should first examine the ship's papers to ascertain her
character, ports of departure and destination, nature of cargo, manner of
employment, and other facts deemed pertinent. ...
7. Regularity of papers and evidence of innocence of cargo, employment or
destination furnished by them are not necessarily conclusive, and, should doubt
exist, the ship's company may be questioned and the ship and cargo searched ....
Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, at 7.7.3.1.
159. U.S. Central Command, Diversion Summary (Jan. 10, 1992).
160. U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990). By use of the language "member states .. .which
are deploying maritime to the area," the Security Council impliedly indicates the area of
interception to be the area within which maritime forces have been deployed to defend
Kuwait.
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waters south of 27 degrees north latitude; Red Sea interception
efforts will be conducted in international waters north of 22
degrees north latitude.' 6
However, the Pentagon did not foreclose the possibility of "enforcement
action in other parts of the region . ,,*"162 It is clear the surveillance
and monitoring of shipping was not limited to the area specified in the
Notice to Mariners but extended "from the North Arabian Gulf, south
through the Arabian Sea, and the full length of the Red Sea.' 1 63
The choke points of the Strait of Hormuz and the Straits of Tiran
facilitate the interception of maritime traffic bound for the ports of
Iraq and the Port of Aqaba in Jordan respectively.'6 Choke points have
been referred to as strategic straits which, because of geographic features,
permit an opportunity to cut off or restrict maritime commercial traffic
to a state or group of states. 65 Surveillance and monitoring operations
were required beyond the area listed in the Notice to Mariners and
beyond the natural choke points of the Strait of Hormuz and the Straits
of Tiran in order "to allow time for boarding-party preparations, to
keep vessels from evading boarding by running for nearby territorial
waters, and to facilitate advanced coordination with other navies .... ,,166
Monitoring activities took place as well in the Mediterranean Sea. 67
161. Special Warning, supra note 129.
162. Michael Gordon, Navy Begins Blockade Enforcing Iraq Embargo, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 17, 1990, at A10 (statement of Williams, Pentagon Spokesperson).
163. Delery, supra note 1, at 68.
164. Id.
165. Lewis M. Alexander & Joseph R. Morgan, Choke Points of the World Ocean:
A Geographic and Military Assessment, 7 Ocean Yearbook 340 (1988). The authors list
three basic criteria for defining choke points:
[First,] there are no readily available alternative maritime routes to use. Second,
these areas are significant to the interests of particular states in terms of the
nature and volume of commercial and military traffic, including aircraft, which
they handle. Third, passage through these choke points must be capable of
being effectively blocked by one or more countries.
Id.
166. Delery, supra note 1, at 66. "Intercepting prohibited cargoes en route to and
from Iraq involves much more than monitoring a few maritime choke points. The Mul-
tinational Interception Force has had to maintain surveillance operations from the North
Arabian Gulf, through the Arabian Sea, and along the full length of the Red Sea." Id.
167. R.W. Apple, Ships Turn Away from Ports as Iraq Embargo Tightens; U.S.
Military Force Pours In; Americans Escape, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al ("In
Washington, government officials said they were monitoring the movement of a Polish
merchant ship, now in the Mediterranean Sea, headed to Iraq with a cargo that might
include weapons."). Id. "Tonight, instructions formally putting into effect the American
led naval blockade ... were issued by the Pentagon to United States warships, in the
Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Arabian Sea." R.W. Apple,
Confrontation in the Gulf. Jordan on Embargo; Teheran to back Sanctions; New Threat
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The lack of designation of the specific area for interception activities
in Resolution 665 allows the states acting unilaterally to determine the
area of operation most useful and efficient for their purposes. Resolution
665 is consistent with the traditional laws of war which permit visit and
search to take place in any area of the sea except for "the maritime
territorial belt of neutrals."' 6s It is immaterial whether the merchant
vessel "is near or far away from that part of the world where hostilities
are actually taking place, ... so long as there is suspicion against the
vessel.'" 69
C. Territorial Seas
Under the traditional concept of the right of visitation, the issue
of whether a belligerent could undertake visit and search activities within
the territorial waters of third parties in addition to the territorial waters
of the enemy "is solely one between the belligerent and his ally, provided
that the latter is already a belligerent.' ' 70 Therefore, as long as an ally
gave permission to a belligerent to engage in visit and search activities
within its territorial waters, the belligerent could resort to such activities
in that area. This limitation is observed in the Commander's Handbook,
which indicates that belligerents must "refrain from all acts of hostility
in neutral territorial waters .... ,,17, Ronzitti takes the position that
state practice has been to limit naval operations to the territorial waters
and areas adjacent to the coast of belligerents. 7 2
Made in Kuwait; Peace Hope Fading, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1990, at Al ("The United
States is continuing to monitor an Iraqi vessel in the Mediterranean .... "). Michael R.
Gordon, Navy Begins Blockade Enforcing Iraq Embargo, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1990, at
10 ("Another Iraqi ship under surveillance in the mediterranean is loaded with tank engines
..... ). Eric Schmitt, U.S. Intercepts and Frees Two Iraqi Ships, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1990, at 4.
168. Oppenheim, supra note 68, § 415, at 848.
169. Id. "The prohibition against visit and search and neutral territory extends to
international straits overlapped by neutral territorial seas and archipelagic sea lanes." The
Commanders Handbook, supra note 22, at 7.6.
170. Oppenheim, supra note 68, § 415, at 849.
171. The Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, at 7.3.4. "Neutral territorial seas
... must not be used by belligerent forces either as a sanctuary from their enemies or
as a base of operations." Id. The only acts of hostilities permitted in neutral territorial
waters are "those necessitated by self defense or undertaken as self help enforcement
actions against enemy forces that are in violation of the neutral status of those waters
when the neutral nation cannot or will not enforce their inviolability." Id.
172. Ronzitti bases this on a review of naval operations in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
the Vietnam war, the Indo-Pakistani war, and the lrn-Iraq war. Ronzitti finds "it is
difficult to say whether this practice is dictated by a legal conviction to do so or by
considerations of advantage as, for instance, when belligerents have limited naval capa-
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U.S. Naval warships as well as other military vessels of the inter-
ception force are allowed at least a right of innocent passage through
the territorial seas of neutral states. 73 Passage which is "not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state" is considered
innocent. 74 Passage must "be continuous and expeditious.'" 17 A laundry
list of activities considered prejudicial is given under Article 19 of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention including "any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
the coastal state" and "any other activity not having a direct bearing
on passage.' ' 7 6 While, without permission, interceptions could not take
place within the territorial sea of nonbelligerent littoral states, theoret-
ically the monitoring or surveillance activities could be conducted within
the territorial sea area so that vessels could be tracked. Passage is judged
by acts undertaken within the territorial sea, so the fact that interception
was the ultimate objective of the tracking vessel would not be prejudicial.
Professor Robertson has indicated that "the cargo, destination, or pur-
pose of the voyage" is not determinative of innocent or non-innocent
passage. 77
U.S. Naval interception operations were consistent with the tradi-
tional right of visit and search, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
and visit and search procedure set forth in the Commander's Hand-
book. 7 1 U.S. Naval forces did not intercept vessels in the territorial seas
of non-belligerent littoral states without permission from the littoral state
concerned, yet did have the ability to engage in interception activities
in the territorial seas of non-belligerent littoral states with permission
of the littoral state concerned. 79 Clearly, Iraqi vessels and others violating
bility." Ronzitti, The Crisis in the Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 45, at 5.
The littoral states in the Persian Gulf claim territorial seas of twelve nautical miles.
By 1959, Saudi Arabia and Iraq claimed territorial seas of twelve nautical miles. Kuwait
claimed a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea in 1967, Sharjah claimed a twelve-nautical-
mile territorial sea in 1970, and Oman claimed a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea in
1972. No gulf states claimed territorial seas beyond twelve miles.
173. 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 17.
174. Id. at Art. 19 (1).
175. Id. at Art. 18 (2).
176. Id. at Art. 19(2)(a) and (1).
177. The Annotated Supplement to the Commanders Handbook, supra note 21, at
2.3.2.1 n.26 (citing Law of the Sea Status of the Law of the Sea Treaty Negotiations:
Hearings on Ser. No. 97-29 Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 413-14 (1982) (testimony of
H.B. Robertson, Prof. of Law, Duke University).
178. Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, at 7.7.1.
179. Telephone interview with Commander Michael Hinkley JAGC, USN, assigned as
Force Judge Advocate to Commander Middle East Force on board the flagship USS La
Salle in the Persian Gulf from September 1989 until August 1991 (Oct. 28, 1991).
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the embargo considered territorial seas of Iran to be a safe haven.8 0
Repeatedly, vessels attempted to escape boarding by entering territorial
seas.'8 ' Iran vociferously protested use of its airspace or territorial waters
by the MIF and Iraq and repeatedly notified the Security Council of a
number of what it considered violations of its territorial sea and air
space.'1
2
The information regarding which states gave permission for the U.S.
Navy or other coalition forces to intercept within their territorial seas
or whether any interception operations actually took place within the
territorial seas of such states remains classified. 83 However, President
Bush publicly thanked the Republic of Djibouti for "opening its airfields,
its sea ports, its territorial waters to allies .... ",14
Resolution 665 "requests all States to provide in accordance with
the Charter such assistance as may be required by the States" enforcing
the sanctions by participating in the interception.' 5 Conceivably, this
request required all states to allow interception activities to take place
within their territorial seas as needed. In fact, binding resolutions, spe-
cifically "those of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, .. . have the effect of law for members of
180. The territorial seas of Iraq and Kuwait could be used for interception activities
under the traditional laws of war. Commander's Handbook, supra note 22.
181. Delery, supra note 1, at 67. The Al Khanaqin consequently attempted to escape
interception by entering Omani territorial waters. Id.
U.S. Navy vessels monitored an Iraqi oil tanker until it reached Yemeni waters, indicating
interception activities could not take place within the territorial seas of Yemeni. MacNeil
NewsHour (Report of MacNeil, PBS television broadcast, Aug. 22, 1990).
The Iraqi oil tanker Al Khanaquin reportedly attempted to evade interception by sailing
in Iranian territorial waters.
182. Iran transmitted perceived violations by means of notes verbales with the request
that the message be transmitted to the U.S. State Department and Iran be "informed of
the response." See U.N. Doc. S/21902 Annex I, Enclosure, Annex II, Annex II, Enclosure
(1990); U.N. Doc. S/21903 Annex I, Enclosure, Annex It, Enclosure (1990); U.N. Doc.
S/21904 (c) Annexes 1, It, III, IV with enclosures (1990); U.N. Doc. S/21905 (c) Annexes
I, II, III, IV, and V with enclosures (1990).
J. Michael Kennedy & John M. Broder, Allies Drive Iraqis From Saudi Town and
Take 167 Prisoners, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1991, at I. Quote of Iranian Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson, Morteza Sarmadi, Teheran Radio. Iran announced that "Iran will continue
to intern planes and ships of all warring parties that enter its air space or its territorial
waters." Id.
183. Telephone interview with Commander Michael Hinkley JAGC, USN, assigned as
the Force Judge Advocate to Commander Middle East Force on board the flagship USS
La Salle in the Persian Gulf from September, 1989, to August, 1991 (Nov. 26, 1991).
184. Departure Remarks by U.S. President George Bush and President Hassan Gouled
of Djibouti, the White House, Washington, D.C., White House Briefing, Federal News
Service (Apr. 24, 1991).
185. U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
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the organization."' 8 6 The question of the use of the territorial seas of
littoral states in the Persian Gulf by the MIF pinpoints a juncture where
rights given under the laws of neutrality theoretically would disappear
in circumstances in which the Security Council has undertaken measures
involving use of force under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
D. Straits
Naval practice of the United States conformed with the regime of
Straits under the 1982 Law of the Sea and the traditional laws of war
in that no interception efforts were made within the Straits of Hormuz
or the Straits of Tiran. 187 While no interception activities took place
within either of the Straits, reports imply MIF monitoring or surveillance
of vessels transiting the straits."" The Strait of Hormuz lies within the
territorial waters of Iran and Oman.8 9 However, this does not change
the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz as an international strait.' 9° As
a strait "used for international navigation between one part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone or another part of the seas or an
exclusive economic zone," the right of transit passage exists through
the Strait.19' All ships and aircraft enjoy the rights of transit passage
or the "continuous and expeditious transit of the Straits," meaning that
vessels must proceed without delay, refrain from any threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independ-
186. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 n.3
(1987). "The United States has recognized the binding character of such resolutions, for
example, the resolution imposing an embargo on products of Southern Rhodesia." Id.
See 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1988).
187. Interview with Commander Michael Hinkley JAGC, USN, supra note 183.
188. For instance, two Iraqi vessels which loaded at an off-shore oil platform belonging
to Iraq in the northern Persian Gulf were tracked, with the first being intercepted in the
Persian Gulf and the second in the Gulf of Oman. Eric Schmitt, Yemen Agrees to Block
Iraqi Oil; Missiles Flow to Kuwait Reported, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1990, at 12. "American
warships continued to shadow two loaded Iraqi oil tankers in waters near the Persian
Gulf today as the ships heading toward the Indian Ocean, showed no signs of reverting,
course, Pentagon official said." Eric Schmitt, Two Iraqi Tankers Ignore Pursuers, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1990, at 14.
189. Sayed Hassen Amin, Political and Strategic Issues in the Persian-Arabian Gulf
94 (1984).
190. Id.
191. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 37.
This regime applies to the entire length and breadth of international straits less
than 24 NM in breadth overlapped by territorial seas not governed by a special
Montreux-type convention, and not qualifying as an island-mainland or "dead-
end" strait.
The great majority of strategically important straits, e.g., Gibraltar Bab el
Mandeb, Hormuz, and Malacca fall into this category.
Annotated Supplement to the Commanders Handbook, supra note 21, at 2.3.3.1 n.37.
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ence of states bordering the strait, and "refrain from any activities other
than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious
transit ... "I Transit passage may not be suspended.' 93 The Straits
of Tiran are classified as a "dead-end" strait connecting a part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a
foreign zone.'9 Innocent passage which may not be suspended applies
in the Straits of Tiran.' 95
E. Persian Gulf Interception as a Method to Enforce Sanctions
Two independent influences bearing on the Persian Gulf interception
demanded minimal interference with shipping and the least destructive
means of enforcement of sanctions. First, as unobtrusive, limited, and
minimal a use of force as possible was required in order to maintain
the fragile coalition of nations supporting the embargo and the inter-
ception. Second, the "new world order" demands the highest adherence
to law and order even in self-defense measures. Although the "new
world order" remains undefined, when discussed, descriptions frequently
involve the terms "legitimate," "sharing of power," "sharing of re-
sponsibility," "justice," and "fairness." While still "emerging," it is
a concept with meaning, specifically "a world where the rule of law
supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the
shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong
respect the right of the weak."' 96
192. 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 38 and 39.
193. Id. at Art. 44.
194. Id. at Art. 45. The so-called "dead-end" straits include the Straits of Tiran,
Head Harbor Passage, Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Passage, the Strait of Georgia, and the Gulf
of Honduras. Annotated Supplement to the Commanders Handbook, supra note 21.
195. "Neutral nations cannot suspend, hamper or otherwise impede this right of transit
through international straits .... Belligerent forces may not use neutral straits as a place
of sanctuary nor a base of operations, and belligerent warships may not exercise belligerent
rights of visit and search in those waters." Commander's Handbook, supra note 22, at
7.3.5.
The principle that belligerents cannot use international straits waters for belligerent
purposes is supported by a majority of writers according to Ronzitti. This is substantiated
by state practice during the Persian Gulf Tanker War during which Oman, in 1980, made
an official protest to Iran that Oman territorial waters were being violated by the attempts
of Iranian warships "to identify passing ships." Further, Ronzitti finds that states' practices
support the obligation of the littoral state to allow passage of neutral and belligerent
vessels from hostilities. Ronzitti, The Cirsis in the Law of Naval Warfare, supra note
45, at 16-18. Ronzitti notes three exceptions: first, during World War I Denmark mined
the Sound, the Great Belt, and the Little Belt; second, Italy closed the Strait of Messina
in 1914; and third, Oman patrolled the territorial water in the Straits of Hormuz during
the Gulf War. Id. at 17.
196. Robert M. Kimmitt, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Economics and National
Security, Address Before the American Bar Association, Section on International Law
and Practice, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 25, 1991) in 2 Dept. of State Dispatch June 3,
1991, at 398.
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Protection of human life and preservation of property is accorded
highest value in this new regime of law and order. Thus, the interception
as an enforcement device had to be above reproach. Accordingly, not
only the means of enforcement, but the objectives were limited. The
objectives were not those of war, but of enforcing the rule of law. As
such, the objectives were specific and clearly articulated in Security
Council resolutions. Speaking to the nature of the enforcement action
endorsed by the Security Council, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar
stated:
The U.N. needed to demonstrate that: The way of enforcement
was qualitatively different from the way of war; as such action
issued from a collective engagement, it required a discipline all
its own; it strove to minimize undeserved suffering to the extent
humanly possible and to search for solutions for the special
economic problem confronted by states arising from the carrying
out of enforcement measures; what it demanded from the party
against [from] which it was employed was not surrender but
the righting of the wrong that had been committed; and it did
not foreclose diplomatic efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution
consistent with charter principles and the determinations made
by the counsel. 97
The interception provides a controlled, limited, and highly precise
enforcement tool which is reasonable and acceptable to the world com-
munity.198 Regardless of the discretion given to intercepting nations under
Resolution 665 as to the area, time, and use of force, the interception
was in form designed to apply the least possible use of force in the
least offensive and most controlled manner possible. Commander Clark
has noted a trend beginning with the Cuban quarantine in interdiction
techniques "to minimize excessive or unreasonable areas of confrontation
and to avoid the excessive and unwarranted destruction of human re-
sources and associated values."' The conditions which prevailed during
the Persian Gulf crisis have strengthened this trend in the interception
as an enforcement tool.
197. "A momentous significance well beyond the crisis .... U.N. Chron. 22 (Dec.
1990).
198. See Clark, supra note 94, at 169 for a discussion of these values in the Vietnam
interdiction. "[Tlhrough the prudent and limited utilization of automatic mines, the United
States established a highly effective maritime interdiction campaign while it simultaneously
avoided any unnecessary confrontation between superpowers and minimized the possiblility
of the unnecessary destruction of a wide range of human values." Id. at 168.
199. Id. at 171.
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F. Sanctioning Device
The interception was initially instituted as a measure short of war
and, as developed in the Persian Gulf setting, is a tool of economic
coercion with specific articulated objectives. 200 In notifying the Security
Council of the U.S. interception operation on August 16, 1990, the
United States indicated the interception was instituted specifically "to
insure that the trade sanctions designed to secure the compliance of
Iraq with Resolution 660 and to restore the legitimate government of
Kuwait, are effective." '20 ' As Lauterpacht indicates, the right of visit
and search as a traditional belligerent right generally has been instituted
in support of another belligerent right or exercise such as blockade or
seizure of contraband.
The United States instituted the interception making clear its ob-
jectives were those of Resolutions 660, 661, and 662, i.e., that Iraq
withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait and that the
legitimate government of Kuwait be restored. Secondarily, the United
States was motivated to weaken Iraq's ability to wage war. Resolution
665 makes clear that the interception operation had as its sole objective
"to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such ship-
ping laid down in Resolution 661 . . .".-20 The objectives were clarified,
publicized to the target state and its citizenry, and presented as the quid
pro quo for termination of the interception. 20 3 The objectives designated
were short, quickly attainable, and within the power of Iraq, the target
state. 204 There was a clear relationship between the sanction and the
remedy, with the onus clearly upon the target state. 20 5 The burden and
the blame for the deprivation under the interception operation was shifted
to Iraq for it was made clear to Iraq that upon the withdrawal of forces
and the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, the inter-
ception operation would be discontinued. This strategy made the exercise
more palatable to the world at large and was beneficial for publicity
200. Economic coercion is applied to bring about the change of policy or activity of
a state. C. Lloyd Brown-John, Multilateral Sanctions in International Law: A Comparative
Analysis 2-4 (1975).
201. Letter from the Charge d'affaires, supra note 125.
202. In the preamble to Resolution 665 (1990) it is stated that the Security Council
institutes the blockade "[rlecalling its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and
664 (1990) and demanding their full and immediate implementation .... " (emphasis in
original).
203. Brown-John, supra note 200, at 16.
204. Id. at 1, 16; see M. Nincic & Peter Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion
(1983).
205. Brown-John, supra note 200, at 1-5; Nincic & Wallensteen, supra note 204, at
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or propaganda purposes.2 06 Further, while the goals were multiple, they
were of a limited number and remained focused on an immediate primary
purpose, the liberation of Kuwait.
20 7
As Professor John Norton Moore notes regarding the mining of
North Vietnam's harbors, "by speaking only of 'interdiction,' President
Nixon avoided inadvertently signaling a wider objective, such as the
economic or political subjugation of North Vietnam, which might have
been implied by the use of the term 'blockade."' 20 The specific, limited
nature of the interdiction does not encourage escalation. Rather, the
practice of spelling out simple demands allows for the rapid de-escalation
of the dispute. The remedy as presented to the world is easy, simple,
direct, and within control of the target state. The interdiction is static
and responsibility for any change in the status quo belongs with the
target state. 209 From the target state's perspective, it is much easier to
respond to the concrete direct demand as a quid pro quo than to an
act that may be an act of reprisal or a first step in the escalation of
a dispute involving numerous interrelated issues. The alternative to change
of policy, the deprivation resulting from the institution of an interception
operation, is presented to the leadership as well as the civilian population
of the target state and allows the sanctioning state to make its case to
the citizenry of the target state. 210 Bush consistently made an appeal to
the Iraqi citizens, saying, "We have no quarrel with the people of
Iraq. '211
In the settings involving the Cuban quarantine and the Vietnam
interdiction, as in the Persian Gulf, the objectives were clarified, pub-
licized to the target state and its citizenry, and presented as the quid
pro quo for the maritime operation. Kennedy required the removal of
the missiles in Cuba, and Nixon required the release of the POWs and
a cease fire under international controls .2 1  Again, the objectives des-
ignated were precise and within the power of the target state. The direct
206. Brown-John, supra note 200, at 1-10; Nincic & Wallensteen, supra note 204, at
15; M.S. Daoudi & M.S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions (1983).
207. Brown-John, supra note 200, at 1-10; Nincic & Wallensteen, supra note 204, at
15; Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 206.
208. Clark, supra note 94 (quoting Moore, a "professor on the law of blockade,"
The Wash. Post, May 21, 1972, at 21). See Moore, The Indo-China War, supra note
91, at 39.
209. Brown-John, supra note 200, at 3; Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 206. Nincic &
Wallensteen, supra note 204.
210. Brown-John, supra note 200, at 16; Nincic & Wallensteen, supra note 204, at 1;
Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 206, at 26-27.
211. Address to the People of Iraq on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 26 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 1389 (Sept. 16, 1990).
212. Clark, supra note 94, at 167.
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relationship between the sanction and the remedy which would remove
the sanction was clear. In the Persian Gulf interception, the Cuban
missile crisis, and the mining of Vietnam harbors, objectives announced
did not include toppling the government. As much as the Bush admin-
istration likely desired the toppling of the Hussein regime and hoped
the interdiction might aid in achieving this purpose, this broader, more
difficult objective was never articulated officially. Simple, limited ob-
jectives may propel the citizenry of the target state to push its leadership
for these limited measures or change in policy, even if toppling the
government or disposing of a dictatorship is beyond its capabilities. In
short, as compared with blockade, the more recent quarantine, inter-
diction, and interception maritime zones are increasingly fine tuned in
purpose."'
G. Product of Compromise and Coalition-Building
The interception operation was a product of compromise and co-
alition-building. The restraint and control built into the interception
procedures was required to maintain an already fragile coalition. The
operation must be "accepted" and considered legitimate by the world
community. 1 4 It must also be perceived by nations as necessary, rea-
sonable, and lawful in all aspects. 25 The result was a carefully crafted
interception procedure which allowed a more flexible, precise measure
of interception.
The introduction of the concept of the "new world order" demanded
that the interception procedures conform to the ideals being espoused.
As a tool of law and order, the interception must observe in the strictest
manner the necessity and proportionality requisites of the use of force.
The increased emphasis on humanitarian concerns in values of life and
property shaped an interception process which, while effective, was
designed to avoid destructive use of force. 21 The terms used to define
the new world order, "legitimate," "sharing of responsibility," "jus-
tice," and "fairness," had to describe the procedures and objectives of
213. Id. at 168.
214. "The 'legitimacy' of an act is a product of persuasion-since the collection of
values and institutions we describe as law are in a process constantly of reconstruction."
Alford, supra note 86, at 292.
215. "The reasonableness of the expectation of necessity by United States decision-
makers will lend force to the persuasive element of law in the situation .... [Wlill other
decisionmakers conclude he has given the proper emphasis to the proper facts? . . . An
initial decision concerning the necessity of the action by officials of a threatened state
may be made; but this decision is subject to reappraisal in a general community perspective
by other decision-makers." Id.
216. See Clark, supra note 94, for a discussion of this factor in the Vietnam interdiction.
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the interception. 21 7 To satisfy these demands, the interception operation
had to be beyond reproach.
H. Structures for Monitoring, Reporting and Advising Allies
Even though Resolution 665 allowed states to determine unilaterally
"such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be
necessary" and did not require that intercepting forces be a United
Nations force or under U.N. command, the Security Council attempted
to retain a measure of control over the interception operation by "re-
questing" that states "co-ordinate their actions ... using as appropriate
mechanisms of the Military Staff Committee and after consultation with
the Secretary-General to submit reports to the Security Council and its
Committee ... to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation of
this resolution . . 2 8 This attempt to control through consultation
and oversight was a compromise between those states such as the Soviet
Union which desired full U.N. control by use of a U.N. force or a
force under U.N. command and states such as the United States and
Great Britain which preferred forces deployed unilaterally under national
command. The "request" that states use the Military Staff Committee
"as appropriate" explicitly signaled a role for the Military Staff Com-
mittee as desired by the Soviet Union; yet, the language was broad
enough to allow discretion to the United States and Great Britain to
use force without resorting to the Military Staff Committee if they
preferred.2 9 Even though the military staff committee never became
active, the contemplated use of these structures permitted compromises
to be made and maintained the fragile coalition by allowing the Security
Council a continuing role of monitoring, reviewing, and advising re-
garding use of force.
The continuing involvement of the Security Council through the
Sanctions Committee and the Military Staff Committee is yet another
example of the moderate and controlled nature of the interception. The
use of the Sanctions Committee for oversight gives rise to a perception
by the world community that the operation is reasonable, controlled,
and limited. An established review process involving the formal structures
217. Kimmitt, supra note 196.
218. U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990).
219. States took different positions regarding the role of the Military Staff committee.
For instance, France took the position that each act of "coercion" would require resort
to the Security Council and presumably the Military Staff Committee. Naval Blockade
Endorsed, U.N. Chron. 17 (Dec. 1990). Prior to the adoption of Resolution 655, China
had objected to the Military Staff Committee meeting to consider or advise regarding the
interception activity in the Persian Gulf since the interception forces were not U.N. forces
or under U.N. command, thereby forcing the Military Staff Committee to meet informally
only. George Riding, France; Paris Stressing Independent Role, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1990, at 6.
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of the Security Council, the Sanctions Committee, and, at least on
paper, the Military Staff Committee stresses that the operation not only
has received the legitimizing approval of the Security Council, but that
its day to day operation is in accordance with "right process" as well.220
Oversight by the Sanctions Committee and, in theory, the Military Staff
Committee "legitimizes" the operation as a product of accepted organs
of authority, rules, and procedures. This validation of the operation is
significant for its acceptance by the international community.
The mandate of the Sanctions Committee regarding the sanctions is
broad. Resolution 661, paragraph 6 establishes the Sanctions Committee
as consisting of all members of the Security Council and directs the
Sanctions Committee first, "to examine the reports on the progress of
the implementation of the present resolution which will be submitted
by the Secretary-General"; second, "to seek from all States further
information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective
implementations laid down and the present resolution"; and third, then
to report the Committee's observations and recommendations to the
Security Council. 22' Resolution 661 "calls upon" the states to cooperate
and supply information sought to the Sanctions Committee and "re-
quests" the Secretary-General "to provide all necessary assistance to the
Committee.' '222 Resolution 666 imposes the responsibility on the Com-
mittee to review reports received from the Secretary-General, under the
guidelines set forth in the resolution, in order to determine whether
"humanitarian circumstances" have arisen, and to "report" to the Se-
curity Council "its decision as to how such needs should be met.
'223
Resolution 669 gives the Sanctions Committee the "task of examining
requests for assistance" which have been submitted under Article 50 of
the U.N. Charter by those states injured by the embargo and "making
recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate
action. ''224
The Security Council has been involved significantly with the hu-
manitarian aspects of the interception operation. The monitoring duties
and the readiness of the United Nations to provide foodstuffs if an
"urgent humanitarian need" arises facilitated the acceptance of an em-
bargo of foodstuffs.2 5 The consensus on the embargo of foodstuffs
might not have been forthcoming if the Committee of the Security
Council had not been able to address major concerns particularly in
220. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 Amer. J.
Int'l L. 705 (1988).
221. U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
222. Id.
223. U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (1990).
224. U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 (1990).
225. Id.
1232 [Vol. 53
1993] MARITIME INTERCEPTION: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1233
making certain that humanitarian needs were addressed, that children
under the age of fifteen, infants, and expectant and nursing mothers
were not deprived, and that there be no delay in humanitarian aid
reaching those in genuine need. 226
The world community would not accept deprivation without the
humanitarian aid exception and the constant monitoring. These safety
valves alleviated the moral pressure that a civilian population not be
made to suffer starvation or lack of medical necessities. The embargo
would not have been sustained without these safeguards. The use of
the Sanctions Committee to oversee and address humanitarian concerns
established a precedent which will be hard to discard. It is doubtful
that a future comprehensive embargo of goods and foodstuffs in an
international environment characterized by intense multilateral involve-
ment and cooperation could ever be imposed without the handling of
humanitarian concerns by formal structures in an organized and com-
prehensive manner.
Typically, decisions would be made by the Sanctions Committee
within their discretion under the mandate given them by the various
Security Council resolutions with these decisions subsequently "ap-
proved" by the Security Council. 2 7 Further, in instances where the
Sanctions Committee could not resolve issues, the Committee would turn
the matter over to the Security Council for resolution. This was the
case regarding the setting of guidelines of Resolution 666 and the decision
of August 15, 1991, to allow Iraq to sell up to 1.6 billion U.S. dollars
worth of oil for a period of six months in order to buy food and
medicine.2"'
226. At the same time, concerns that the Sanctions remain firm were alleviated by
the obligation to donate and distribute food stuffs and other supplies for humanitarian
aid through the U.N. and international humanitarian agencies. See supra note 137.
227. For instance, in making its decision on March 22, 1991 to permit delivery of
food and "humanitarian supplies," the Sanctions Committee notified the Security Council
of its decision for approval. John M. Goshko, U.N. to Let Iraq Receive Food; Sanctions
Eased After Report Described Dire Conditions, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1991, at A15.
228. Iraq Accuses France of Hypocrisy in Proposed U.N. Resolution on Oil Sales,
British Broadcast Corp., Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 14, 1991, at NElI50AI.
The activities of the Sanctions Committee illustrates that this is truly a "working body
of the Security Council." For instance, on November 8, 1990, it was reported that Marjatta
Rasi, as chairperson of the Sanctions Committee, described "tons and tons of medicines
imported by Iraq with possible significance for chemical and biological warfare production.
On March 22, 1991, the Sanctions Committee decided, in response to a report generated
from a U.N. team headed by Under Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari which examined
conditions in Iraq during March 10 to 17, 1991, and which warned of possible "epidemic
and famine," to allow unlimited food imports and an easing of restraints on other
humanitarian aid. On May 4, 1991, the Sanctions Committee determined that individual
governments could unfreeze Iraq's assets to allow Iraq to buy food as long as the Sanctions
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I. Protection of Non-Target States
Article 50 of the U.N. Charter permitted another moderating element
of the embargo and interception in that the effect of the embargo and
interception could be precisely and incisively directed toward Iraq and
made less disruptive of the commerce and the economies of the nations
which traded with Iraq.2 29 This gives a "right" to any state, other than
the target state, which encounters "special economic problems" for
measures taken by the Security Council directed against the target state,
to "consult with the Security Council" in finding a "solution." 230 This
provision is a recognition that, because of "geographic reasons" or
"special economic and financial relations with the victim state" or the
states being sanctioned, measures may affect certain countries more than
others. 23 ,
By January 31, 1991, the Sanctions Committee had presented a
recommendation to the President of the Security Council for an "appeal
to all states on an urgent basis to provide immediate technical and
financial assistance" and an invitation to "international organizations
and development institutions to review and upgrade their assistance
programs with" twenty nations.2 2 "Moral suasion" rather than specific
Committee is notified and no member objects. On July 22, 1991, after considering the
report of Prince Sabruddin Aga Khan, who heads the U.N. humanitarian program in
Iraq, the Sanctions Committee, unable to agree on a formula for the sale of Iraqi oil
to finance food purchases, turned the matter over to the Security Council. The Security
Council subsequently approved the sale of up to 1.6 billion U.S. dollars' worth of oil
during a period of six months to purchase food and medicine with oil sales approved by
the Sanctions Committee and oil revenue paid directly into an escrow account for the
U.N. Secretary-General to finance such purchases. UN to Vote On Oil Sales For Iraq,
The Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Aug. 14, 1991, Item No. 0814021.
229. See Clark, supra note 94, at 165 for a discussion of the effect of the Vietnam
interdiction on neutral commerce.
230. U.N. Charter article 50. This has been called "a corollary to the obligation of
mutual assistance under Article 49" which states, "IT]he Members of the United Nations
shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by
the Security Council." Goodrich et al., supra note 29, at 338, 341.
U.N. Charter article 50 states: "[I1f preventive or enforcement measures against any
state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United
Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from
the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council
with regard to a solution of those problems." Id. at 340.
231. Goodrich et al., supra note 29, at 341. In drafting this article, the Collective
Measures Committee sought a need for consultation with the Security Council and the
need for an ability to coordinate aid which might take the form of "direct assistance in
cash or kind, provisions of alternative sources of supply and alternative markets, specific
commodity purchase agreement [and] compensatory adjustments of international tariffs."
Id.
232. U.N. Official Says Countries Suffering Indirectly From Sanctions Need Assistance,
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amounts of money were requested on behalf of twenty nations. 233 By
March 22, 1991, twenty-one nations had appealed to the Secretary-
General requesting assistance with economic financial and commercial
losses estimated to aggregate thirty billion dollars.13 4 The Security Council
made a "solemn appeal" for aid to those nations injured by the sanc-
tions .23
No definition or guideline is given in the U.N. Charter regarding
the meaning of "special economic problems. '23 6 In submitting requests
to the Security Council for consultations under Article 50, many states
listed not only direct economic loss, but indirect economic loss as well.
Direct economic losses claimed included freezing of outstanding claims
against Iraq under the sanctions, the freezing or possible loss of other
claims which would become payable subsequently, suspension of con-
tracts in effect (loss of imports and exports), and unspecified direct loss
particularly from contracts nearing completion. 23 7 Indirect economic losses
BNA Int'l Trade Daily, Jan. 31, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter Countries Suffering Indirectly]
(quoting Carl-August Fleishchhauer, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal
Counsel to the United Nations).
233. Ron Howell, U.N. Committee: Help Jordan Survive, Newsday, Sept. 18, 1990,
at 15 (citing Rasi, Chairwoman of the Sanctions Comittee). "It sort of legitimizes that
Jordan is indeed suffering." (Quote of an unnamed U.S. official.) Id.
234. UN Appeals for Help to Countries Affected by Gulf Crisis, The Xinhua Gen.
Overseas News Serv., Apr. 29, 1991, Item No. 0429009. The countries include Bangladesh,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Djibouti, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uruguay,
Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. Id.
235. Council President Paul Noterdaeme of Belgium made the appeal stating, "[Tihe
members of the council make a solemn appeal to states, financial institutions and UN
bodies to respond positively and speedily to the recommendations to the Security Council
committee ... for assistance to countries which find themselves confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures imposed by Resolution
661 and which have invoked Article 50." United Nations: Plea on Behalf of States Hit
by Iraq Sanctions, Inter Press Serv., Apr. 29, 1991.
236. August Fleishchhauer, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and Legal Coun-
sel to the United Nations, distinguishes between general consequences, i.e. increases in
oil prices, lost business opportunities, and loss of aid, and those economic problems
directly resulting from the sanctions and the disruption of "economic, financial, and air
links with Iraq and occupied Kuwait." Countries Suffering Indirectly, supra note 232, at
4.
237. See Letter Dated October 2, 1990, From The Prominent Representative of Cze-
choslovakia To The United Nations Addressed To The President Of The Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/21837 (1990). Sri Lanka included worker remittances from abroad. Letter
Dated September 5, 1990, From a Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/21710 (1990).
Mauritania included the disruption of joint ventures with Iraq and Kuwait and the
discontinuance of investment and export programs for these joint ventures. Annex to
Letter Dated September 24, 1990, From the Permanent Representative of Mauritania to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/21818 (1990).
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included loss from an increase of oil prices, impact on balance of
payments, impact on inflation and economic growth, socio-economic
conditions, the devaluation of currency, inflation, and disruption of
foreign aid.238 The response included unilateral contributions from states
and regional organizations. Unilateral contributions of funds were made
by Austria, Japan, Ireland, Norway, the Soviet Union, Switzerland, the
United States, and the European Economic Community.23 9 On September
7, the European Economic Community promised two billion dollars held
in aid on an emergency basis to Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey.214 Further,
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela announced a significant increase in pro-
duction of oil to make up for oil embargoed under the sanctions. 241
J. Heightened Effectiveness
The interception was successful in that virtually all commercial mar-
itime traffic to Iraq and occupied Kuwait ceased. While the declared
objective to force a change in the policy of the state was not met, the
interception did keep pressure on Hussein and diminished Iraq's capacity
to wage war.2 42 Enforcement was restrained and effectiveness heightened
while the potential for destructiveness or injury was diminished. 243
K. Discriminating and Selective
The concept of visit and search and the enforcement methods used
allowed a discriminating interdiction of cargo destined for or leaving
238. See Letter Dated September 5, 1990, From The Permanent Representative of Sri
Lanka to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/21710 (1990); Letter Dated September 10, 1990, from the Permanent Representative
of Lebanon to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/
21737 (1990); Annex to Letter Dated September 24, 1990, from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation of Mauritania Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/21818 (1990).
239. UN Appeals for Help to Countries Affected by Gulf Crisis, supra note 234.
240. Michael Binyon, E.C. Promises Assistance for Hardest Hit Arab States, The
Times (London), Sept. 8, 1990, at 8. On the same date, Britain announced it would give
a financial aid package to Syria in light of Syria's contributions and cooperation with
the Allies. Id.
241. Janet Cawley & Christopher Drew, Bush Asserts Troop Mission is "Defensive",
The Chicago Tribune, Aug. 9, 1990, at 1.
242. "The very quiet, very professional way [the Navy) put that embargo on-which
continues to this day, out of sight, but very, very effective-may be one of the most
important things we did." Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note 1, at 13 (quoting Gen.
Merrill McPeak, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff).
243. This is a trend emphasized by Clark regarding the Vietnam mining operation.
"fT]he United States established a highly effective maritime interdiction campaign while
it simultaneously avoided any unnecessary confrontation between super powers and min-
imized the possibility of the unnecessary destruction of a wide range of human values."
Clark, supra note 94, at 160, 168.
1236 [Vol. 53
19931 MARITIME INTERCEPTION: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1237
Iraq without preventing all maritime traffic to and from Iraq. The ability
to direct interception efforts towards specific cargo allows enforcement
of a comprehensive embargo and conformance to humanitarian requisites
in that medicines may pass freely as required. Likewise, if authorized
and controlled by the Sanctions Committee, foodstuffs may also pass
under humanitarian circumstances.
There was no blockade of or interference with legitimate shipping
to neutral ports. The highly selective and incisive nature of the inquiry
enabled legitimate commerce to proceed freely, leaving undisturbed trade
between all nations except the target state. The area of enforcement
was limited and, compared to the Navicert system used in World War
II, a small percentage of shipping was affected with only 211 vessels
diverted out of 12,648 vessels challenged as of January, 1992.21
L. Highly Controlled
Each encounter was a circumstance-specific exercise. The boarding
"teams gauged carefully the amount of resistance to be encountered,
force requirements and necessary measures to ensure the safety of board-
ing personnel." 245 Flexibility was built into the process. An array of
options consisting of different teams and different levels of force allowed
different responses. A variety of teams with specialized skills were used
as needed. Four-man teams of Coast Guard LeDets experienced in visit
and search of drug smuggling vessels and familiar with shipping laws,
documents, procedures, and the search process executed the majority of
the boardings. 2" Marine Special Operations Teams of ten Marines each,
experienced in "small-unit tactics, helicopter insertion, and rapid response
to contingency situations," together with Navy SEALS, boarded vessels
judged dangerous.2 47
A series of tactics available to the on-scene commander escalating
toward use of force when the challenged vessel refused to cooperate
included: giving time limits for compliance, forcing the vessel to slow
by moving MIF vessels across the bow of the challenged vessel, firing
warning shots in sequence across the bow of the challenged vessel, low-
level passes by S-14 and S/A-18 aircraft, and additionally, insertion of
244. U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, Multinational Maritime
Intercept Summary, Jan. 10, 1992 (on file with author). See also Clark, supra note 94,
at 71, 73, and 84 for a discussion of the Vietnam interdiction as a limited, precise, and
selective tool.
245. Delery, supra note 1, at 68.
246. Id.; Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note 1, at 12.
247. Delery, supra note 1, at 68; Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note 1, at 12.
"Their ability to place a boarding team on a non-cooperative vessel via helicopter has
been a significant factor in maritime interception operations." Delery, supra note 1, at
68.
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Marines by helicopter and U.S. sailors and Coast Guard LeDets from
small boats, with reinforcements possible.248 Attempts were always made
to convince ship masters to comply by show of overwhelming force
rather than by use of force.
As the type and amount of force was constantly within human
control, de-escalation, like escalation, was always possible if confron-
tation was not desired. Use of force could be arrested at any level. Due
to the allowance of time and decision-making, human control could be
exercised on numerous levels. 249 Reportedly, President Mitterand's per-
mission was required before any French vessels could use "force. 20
Similarly, Fogarty's authorization was required prior to "use of force"
by U.S. vessels.
M. Notice and Options Given Intercepted Vessel
In addition to public announcements made by U.S. Secretary of
State James Baker on August 12, 1990, and the U.S. Department of
Defense Press Release of August 16, 1990, Special Warning No. 80
issued by the U.S. Department of the Navy on August 17, 1990, gave
clear notice of the area and intention of immediate effectiveness and
manner of interception.25" ' With knowledge of the general area of in-
terception, ship masters had time and opportunity to consider options
and make a reasoned choice whether to enter the zone and be challenged.
At all times the decision to enter the zone was voluntary and within
the control of the ship master.2 12 Special Warning No. 80 gave clear
notice of which ships would be intercepted: "All merchant ships perceived
to be proceeding to or from Iraqi or Kuwaiti ports, or transshipment
points and carrying embargoed material to or from Iraq or Kuwait."
248. Delery, supra note 1, at 71.
249. Regarding the boarding of the Zanoobia, "[tihe Master was unwilling to divert,
and the decision was passed down the U.S. chain of command to take control of the
ships." Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note 1, at 11.
250. Id.
251. Statement of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, Press Release of Aug. 12,
1990 [hereinafter Press Release of James Baker]; Desert Shield memorandum, supra note
128; see Clark, supra note 94, at 168 for a discussion of the role of notification in
minimizing destruction.
252. Clark, supra note 94, at 166.
This general builtin delaying feature of "blockade" or "maritime interdiction,"
which because of its relative slowness to operate gives each side time to think
and therefore reduces the risks associated with such an operation, is of critical
importance to the decision makers involved in reducing the likelihood that a
hasty decision might be forthcoming.
Id. Laurence W. Martin finds "blockade thus has one of the most desirable characteristics
in a technique of crisis management, that of transferring the onus of escalation to the
other side." Id. (citing Laurence W. Martin, The Sea in Modern Strategy 160 (1968)).
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Notice was given of the procedure which would be followed. If perceived
as proceeding to a prohibited port with prohibited cargo and within the
interception area, the vessels "will be intercepted and may be searched,"
and if verified "will not be allowed to proceed with their planned
transit. ' 2 3 Shipmasters were aware of the limited objectives and the
limitation of action to be taken against them as well as the routine.
Knowledge of the components of the operation encouraged effective,
rational decision-making by ship masters in choosing options. 2 4 Com-
munication and interaction between the interceptors and the intercepted
was ongoing. Persuasion was aided by verbal interaction as well as by
the possibility of forceful tactics. Misconception could be clarified and
tensions reduced.255
Any vessel destined for Aqaba, Kuwait, or Iraq was subject to being
boarded and searched. Vessels intercepted and challenged were offered
the option of diverting without being boarded.2 56 If boarding was opted
for and prohibited goods found, the master again was offered the option
of diverting to an alternative port. 2 7 Confrontation was avoidable at
each juncture. Clear "avenues of withdrawal" and compliance were
offered to the intercepted vessel throughout the process.' '258
N. Multilateral Effort
The multilateral effort and cooperation generated solidarity and
resolve in enforcing the sanctions. The pressure of world opinion was
brought to bear on Hussein. Efforts of national forces under unilateral
command with coordination up and down and between respective chains
of command proved to be an "effective" deployment of force under
253. Id.; Press Release of James Baker, supra note 251.
254. "The most essential requirement for coordination in economic action is action
of a familiar and accustomed pattern. This enhances the likelihood of a rational response
of the opponent along predictable lines." Alford, supra note 86, at 292-93.
"In some cases, the blockading or interdicting nation must also make a decision such
as whether to board or block passage of a vessel. It is the blockade-running nation,
however, which must first make the key decision to bring about such a confrontation
once the blockader's prestige is placed on the line." Clark, supra note 94, at 169 (citing
Martin, supra note 252, at 160).
255. "The Reasoner's Commanding Officer, as the on-scene commander, issued warn-
ings via bridge-to-bridge radio .. . . [Alfter repeated radio calls the master finally stated
that it would take two to three hours to contact the ships owners in Iraq .... [Tlhe
Reasoner advised the Amuriyah that she would have fifteen minutes to comply with the
warnings, by slowing the ship." Delery, supra note 1, at 71.
256. Id. at 67.
257. Id.
258. "It is within the interests of the United States ... to provide avenues of with-
drawal when withdrawals are consistent with the United States policy." Alford, supra
note 86, at 292.
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Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and established use of national forces
under national command as a precedent under Chapter VII. 2 9 The
coalition efforts sustained support for the sanctions bringing pressure
to bear on those nations which might otherwise not have complied. The
concerted action by twenty nations and the U.N. endorsement and
Sanctions Committee monitoring contributed to the perception that the
interception was legitimate and reasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.N. Resolution 665 endorsement of the interception illustrates
the pliancy of the Charter framework. 260 Provisions are susceptible of
interpretations necessary to serve the need at hand. Nations can work
together within the structure of the U.N. Charter and resolve differences
through compromise.
Benefits of working within the U.N. Charter to resolve disputes and
respond to aggression will prompt increased use of and a larger en-
forcement role for the United Nations and other international organi-
zations. As the Security Council is strengthened, it will engage itself
more frequently in disputes at an earlier stage, denominate an aggressor,
and enact measures under Chapter VII.
The interception set a new standard in enforcement. Tactics achieved
heightened efficiency and heightened protection of life and property.
The pressures of cooperation and coalition-building will continue to
encourage this development. The interception is a proven enforcement
tool and has established a precedent under Chapter VII. Since the United
Nations has practical experience with the interception, the Security Coun-
cil should be less hesitant to resort to its use in the future.
A larger role for the interception is advocated, as the United Nations
addresses disputes in new contexts such as preventing the transfer of
nuclear arms to dictatorships or resolving endless regional wars. Effective
use of sanctions by the United Nations to resolve international peace
and security requires that the interception process be an accepted part
of the Article 41 sanctioning process. In the Persian Gulf context, the
interception as a method to enforce sanctions under Chapter VII is
more closely associated with Article 41 sanctions than with Article 42
259. "The evidence is clear that the naval enforcement of U.N. Sanctions against Iraq
was a major force in demonstrating to the world that the allies could form an effective
military coalition." Severing Saddam's Lifeline, supra note 1, at 12-13.
"The high degree of coordination exhibited by the multi-national naval force in enforcing
sanctions reflected years of peacetime training and cooperation between the United States
and her allies." Id.
260. David Scheffer, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace;
Press Briefing on Multilateral Options in the Persian Gulf Crisis Sponsored By the United
Nations Association of the U.S., Federal News Serv. (Oct. 9, 1990).
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measures involving use of force. While the blockade is listed in Article
42, the interception, based on visit and search, is conceptually distinct
from the blockade.2 61 Although visit and search is considered a use of
force under traditional laws of war, the procedures carefully geared to
divert without actual use of force make a destructive use of force
unlikely.2 62 Used in conjunction with sanctions to force resolution of
disputes, the interception functions as a device to prevent war. Parallels
can be drawn with the United Nations peacekeeping forces, and inter-
ception should be approached in as flexible a manner. 263 While use of
interception to enforce U.N. sanctions provides a strong argument for
a U.N. navy, a proposal made by the Soviets in 1987, the Persian Gulf
experience teaches that naval operations commanded unilaterally with
cooperation among commands can be highly effective. The Gulf War
also teaches that enforcement under Chapter VII is not rigidly confined
but affords the Security Council leeway to creatively, efficiently, and
effectively restore international peace and security.
261. Regarding the Cuban quarantine, Captain McDevitt argues "that the Quarantine
may be considered a measure for 'specific' settlement of the dispute and not the 'en-
forcement action.' described in Article 53(l) of the Charter. Alford, supra note 86, at
288.
262. From August, 1990, to January, 1992, out of the total of seventeen instances in
which vessels refused to stop, warning fire was used in only eleven instances, while
disabling fire was never used and no ships were disabled. U.S. Central Command, Diversion
Summary (Jan. 1992) (on file with author).
263.
An emergency international UN Force can be developed on the basis of three
different concepts:
(a) it can, in the first place, be set up on the basis of principles reflected in
the Constitution of the United Nations itself. This would mean that its chief
responsible officer should be appointed by the United Nations and that he, in
his function, should be responsible ultimately to the General Assembly and/or
the Security Council....
(b) second possibility is that the United Nations charge a country, or a group
of countries, with responsibility to provide independently for an emergency
international Force serving for purposes determined by the United Nations....
(c) Finally, as a third possibility, an emergency international force may be set
up in agreement among a group of nations, later to be brought into an ap-
propriate relationship to the United Nations.
Higgins, supra note 31.
See The Middle East: Hearing Before Subcommittee on the Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1991) for discussion of rapid deployment force.

